ASPECTS OF DEMOCRACY

THE DEFENSE

LECTURE SERIES

OF

LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY

Edited by

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Preface

ROBERT Maynard Hutchins said recently that the greatest need of a democracy is to know what it is fighting for, that only with such knowledge is it able to fight effectively against the enemies that are committed to its destruction. He added that the university that could give such knowledge would make a contribution to defense more important than that of all the aeronautical schools and military measures. Naturally, he did not mean to minimize the need of the latter. One cannot fight without instruments and the men to use them. But always more essential than means are ends: in what cause are the instruments and the men to be used? If we are uncertain about what we are fighting for or do not even think we have something to fight for, we cannot use instruments well; a people does not discipline itself in response to mere political oratory, nor do men contentedly die because of official decisions. Bureaucrats cannot mimeograph morale, nor authorities command courage.

The present essays, originally radio talks, were the product of the conviction that the university's best contribution to

democracy lies in the realm of ideas, the university's own sphere; that knowledge of democracy is the only basis for an effective defense of it. And implicit in these essays in definition is the important realization that knowledge is more than praise, that understanding must go beyond slogans. There is also the recognition that democracy is more than the stock-in-trade of "catchword patrioteers," than an arsenal of fighting words to shoot at anybody who holds an opinion different from one's own, than a slick device for freezing the *status quo* in all its attributes or even for reverting to earlier days when the principle of "liberty" was more effectively used in the defense of prerogative. There is present here a real sense of the dangers we face and of the identity—to use a phrase well worn these days—of the enemy within the gates: those who, though they profit from living under a democratic system, do not really want it in its completeness but wish to restrict it to the kind of operations which will least interfere with their own perquisites and privileges and powers; those who, consequently, want to stifle—often, ironically, in the name of democracy—the refreshing opinions of men and women who critically face shortcomings and abuses, cut through the pretenses of the entrenched interests, and propose means for the fuller realization of democracy and all that it implies for the life of man. Perhaps nothing is more difficult, in tense and crucial times, than to make the utterly important distinction between real subversion and what is often for selfish purposes and by demagogic means made to resemble it—the critical forthrightness, in whatever field of thought or endeavor, that is one of the fundamental supports of democratic morale and integrity. The critic is to be disbarred as "uncooperative." Too often uncooperativeness is made a vice when cooperation can mean only knuckling

under, and falling into line is made a virtue when for democracy's sake one must uncompromisingly demand that present shortcomings give way to future improvement.

In this way alone can democracy make progress. The essayists in this volume speak variously of progress, suggesting a general awareness that it is more than complacency in material phenomena; that is does mean, on the contrary, constant effort to eradicate the failures and injustices which perennially appear. And it becomes clear that the only approach to the completing of democracy lies in a critical alertness to detect the half-done, the misleading appearance, the protestation that befogs the issue, the inconsistency of theory and performance. There is encouragingly full evidence of this essential critical alertness. Its importance is acknowledged by the writer who finds one of the merits of the representative assembly in the fact that its members "constantly criticize those in the seats of authority." Another remarks that of the democratic traditions "perhaps the most important of all was the right to criticize." Two other writers remind us of the danger of attacks upon our liberties from within. There is adequate indication of the kind of attack to look out for:

> There are undoubtedly a great many people . . . today who think that only fairly well-to-do or fairly well-educated people should vote.
>
> . . . a good many people in America appear not to like a form of government that provides for responsibility. . . . They say that the people are not fit to pass judgment on the policies and acts of their officials; . . . that it would be better if we gave a strong man almost unlimited power and told him to go to it and clean things up.
>
> . . . a good many people . . . do not want our government to do things which accord with the wishes of the general public. They do not want to give up the privileges which they have. They call poor people rabble and say they should not be allowed to vote. And they

do this because they are afraid that poor people will pass laws that cut in on the advantages which they have got or hope to get.

The economic flavor of the last quotation suggests a slightly different kind of critical analysis, one which goes into the basic causes of the situation:

> Democracy . . . became identified with . . . capitalism . . . . [It] came . . . to be measured in material terms. It was good because it was the form of government under which men got rich . . . . Men ceased to be men and became factory hands, so many tools for the production of wealth. . . . Under a system based on a theory of equality, enormous economic inequality developed. Under a system committed to the principle of freedom, people became enslaved by poverty.

This historical account of ironic developments leads inevitably to the conclusion: "It [democracy] must be cut free from the inconsistencies and the weaknesses with which it has been undermined."

Another writer dealing primarily with economic issues suggests a specific way of getting rid of one such inconsistency, the concentration of economic power. He shrewdly asks whether the process must not "culminate in a government pledged to do the bidding of the great corporations but ultimately, as in Germany, doing the bidding only of itself?" He concludes:

> The task, then, is to check the drain of economic power into the hands of those corporate interests which already have more of this world's goods and more of this power than is well in a democracy which proposes to continue in the democratic path. . . . We need a return to democratic principles of corporate control and to a use of the corporation which will be of maximum benefit to the community. The cooperative society has provided the means in Sweden—it has made the consumer a citizen in an economic democracy.

Elsewhere there is further emphasis upon the way in which

monetary or commercial or political "interests" militate against democracy:

> What about the family and the community? Can the family have the fullness of democracy in any community which permits conditions that are a denial of democracy, which permits the dictatorships of vested-interest minorities whose motto seems to be: "Of the dollars, by the dollars, and for the dollars"; in any community in which interests and political machines must be protected at all costs, even though democracy disintegrates as one of the costs? For example, take the housing problem so important for decency in democracy. I know at least four cities from Vermont to Louisiana which have recently refused to admit that they had any slums—a denial of cold fact. . . . Thus do vested minorities dictate and endanger democracy at the very threshold of the home. . . . The Scandinavian democracies were ahead of Uncle Sam on the sunlit highway of family and public welfare, and only now is he beginning to catch up. Yet many of our local communities hang back in the shadows of things that, in a democracy, ought not to be.

We could find no more compact summary than this: "We have been having, and still are having, our individual and family rights invaded before our eyes by men who are hurting themselves and others by an abuse of privilege and power."

If, on the one hand, there is exposed a pretense that is motivated by economic interest, we find an attack, also, on other kinds of pretense. There is, for instance, the kind of religious bigotry that masquerades as "Americanism." "It is a duty of American citizenship to condemn such activities, from whatever quarter they may emanate and however sincere their leadership may be."

When there is so much awareness of the dangers against which we must guard, it is natural that the contributors stress the responsibilities of those who want to live in a democracy; and they stress it with healthy frequency. One remarks that

democracy is not "merely a kind of Christmas present to be picked off the tree and rejoiced in" and another that we "cannot toot our horns and get democracy by curb-service." Instead, we are told, we must apply ourselves in definite ways:

> . . . we must take the time and give the effort necessary to understand our problems.
>
> To try . . . to keep freedom of speech for a means of individual satisfaction leading to the good of the entire group, is the responsibility of each one of us.
>
> We . . . must be prepared to make our minds a battlefield where we can fight against the insidious totalitarian attacks on our morale.

This preparation consists partly in knowing what democratic countries have done—their achievements in extending education, increasing humanitarianism, raising standards of living, firmly establishing freedom of expression and of worship. These achievements are later discussed in detail; here we need only note the resemblance between a number of general statements written independently by different contributors:

> Even now . . . a detour is too often made around the greatest exponent of democratic essentials the world has ever known, Jesus of Nazareth, . . .
>
> Democracy is one of the expressions of the Christian and Jewish ideal of the dignity of the individual man.
>
> It [democracy] gave to common men a sense of independence, of individual worth and dignity, of satisfactory achievement such as has rarely been accorded them in history.
>
> This superiority of morale [of democratic peoples] . . . is attributable to the fact that the democratic form of government corresponds to the higher aspirations of the human race.

If this volume as a whole seems to have less unity than may be suggested by these comments and excerpts, which have been selected to show in what ways there is a community of thought

and feeling, it is nevertheless notable that there is so much of the same direction, the same monitory and critical outlook, the same sense of where our basic values lie and in what they consist. For no master-plan governed the contents of the essays or the attitudes taken by the writers; the subjects were selected merely as various possible approaches to the subject of democracy. The arrangements were the responsibility of a committee composed of Colonel Roy A. Hill, Commandant of Cadets; Wendell H. Stephenson, Professor of History; Ralph Steetle, Director of Radio Programs; Arden French, Dean of Men; Arthur R. Choppin, Professor of Chemistry; and Alden L. Powell, Associate Professor of Government, Chairman. The editor wishes to acknowledge the helpfulness of Professor Powell and Colonel Hill in preparing the volume for publication.

The essays were originally read before student convocations and simultaneously broadcast by Station WJBO, Baton Rouge. They were recorded for further distribution, and many mimeographed copies were mailed out each week. In these various efforts to secure as wide an audience as possible for different discussions of democracy is evidence that Louisiana State University has wished to make this most important part of her defense program not a mere gesture but an effective force.

One contributor says of the University that it is "not called upon to depart, nor should it depart, from the maintenance of its traditional ideals"— a most important reminder in the tense times in which universities, in bursts of mistaken zeal, are not unlikely to surrender traditional ideals or to subordinate them to the more material aspects of national defense. Another contributor appends a most significant amplification: "Our mental defenses must be armed with knowledge of the past. . . ." Pre-

sumably that means that we must know not merely the facts, however stimulating, of the failure of earlier dictators and tyrants, but chiefly the whole tradition of Western man, the accomplishments of mind and spirit, the aspirations which make the free human being of sufficient dignity to be worth defending. From such knowledge comes the will to defend a system based on the idea of the free human being. From belief alone can come the discipline essential to real strength; without belief there is only the ineffectual discipline by authority. What we need is an intensification of belief, not the suspension of disbelief for the duration that is so often implied in behests for cooperation. We get cooperation not by asking for it but by making operative the values in behalf of which self-respecting human beings will cooperate, by doing something concrete about the threats to democracy "by those whose quest is for self, for pelf, and for power," by making a constant effort to deal with, instead of gloss over, present imperfections. *Pro patria mori* is always *dulce et decorum,* but they who are to die want to be assured that theirs is a real *patria,* and not merely a geographical division. To distinguish between deities and mummies, between democracy and imitations of it, there is always necessary the critical spirit of these essays; in that spirit lies the essence of democracy, which, as one writer says, assumes "a certain reasonableness; a willingness to discuss differences, and an ability to resolve them peaceably; a hatred of despotic authority, but a capacity for self-discipline." Another writer annotates *self-discipline* in two statements that may fittingly conclude this introduction: "Not that I need to agree with the majority, but I must concede the rights of others to have opinions different from mine," and "I should be given the right to disagree. . . ."

I

DEFINITIONS

Grassroots of Democracy

CHARLES S. HYNEMAN

I WOULD not look with pleasure on the task of explaining the fundamental characteristics of democracy in a limited space. But my job is more difficult than that. I must explain what democracy is, defend it—for there are those in America today who do not believe in democracy—and say at least a few things about what we can do to preserve our democratic system.

I am sure that very few of us have ever decided just what we mean when we use the word *democracy* or when we say that we believe in a democratic system of government. Even those of us who are reasonably clear as to what we mean by democracy have different things in mind when we use the term.

I do not want anyone to misunderstand what I mean. Democratic government, as I shall use the term, involves three ideas: first, that we give a very inclusive group of people the right to vote; second, that we organize our government so that persons who are responsible to the people make the most important political and governmental decisions; third, that the things which our government does must be, on the whole, pretty satisfactory to the great mass of people. Democratic government, as I am going to use the term, requires these three things.

I do not want to say just what percentage of the people must be given the right to vote. If we took the right to vote away from women, I might still say that we are democratic. If we raised the required age for voting from 21 to 25, I might still say that we have a democratic system. But if we provided that only rich people could vote, then I should say that we had ceased to be democratic in our methods.

Now you will begin to see why I say that a good many people do not really believe in what I call democratic government, though they may not have the courage to say so. There are undoubtedly a great many people in America today who think that only fairly well-to-do or fairly well-educated people should vote. Certainly a lot of people believe that men and women who are on relief or are employed by WPA should not be allowed to vote. As long as I am in a position to make the definitions, I will say that such people do not believe in democratic government. What they want is an aristocracy, not a democracy.

I listed, as a second attribute of democratic government, that the important decisions or acts of government must be made by persons who are responsible to the people. This is not an easy matter to explain. What constitutes being responsible to the people? Even a tyrant may be afraid of getting shot and may consequently model his actions in part to suit the people. Adolph Hitler keeps his ear to the ground. He is always eager to know what the German people think about his policies. People that object too strongly may be bumped off. But if there is a nationwide complaint against this or that, you may be sure that Mr. Hitler will take account of it and make some modification of his policy to meet the objection.

Is that what I mean by responsibility? Not by any means. A

government must be a whole lot more responsible to the people than Adolph Hitler's is before I will call it democratic. At least its more important laws and policies must be made by an assembly which is elected by the people and which is not compelled to take orders from any particular individual or clique. And the chief executive officers must realize very clearly that they will lose their jobs reasonably soon after the people have lost confidence in them.

I regret to say that a good many people in America appear not to like a form of government that provides for responsibility as I have described it just now. They say that the people are not fit to pass judgment on the policies and acts of their officials; that it takes people too long to make up their minds; that Congressmen ought to quit criticizing the President because Congressmen are windbags and never get anything done; that it would be better if we gave a strong man almost unlimited power and told him to go to it and clean things up.

That, in my opinion, is a lazy man's dream. It is a hankering to have someone do our work for us and relieve us of responsibility. It is a dream that has been dreamed for ages—the longing for a benevolent despot.

It is not always a futile longing. Sometimes a nation gets a despot who is benevolent, who rules to the satisfaction of the people. But an awful lot of powerful rulers—despots—have proved to be anything but satisfactory to the people. Some started all right and turned out bad. Others started out bad and never fooled anybody by getting any better.

I cannot easily imagine anything more foolish than for the American people to give up their control over the individuals who govern them—give up their representative Congress and elected President—for a ruler who does not have to answer

to the people for all of the important things he does. We have no basis in either history or reason for believing that we can free our President from his responsibility to Congress and to the people, and still retain any assurance that he will exercise his power in the general interest. We cannot have any confidence that government in America will be to our liking unless we maintain constant check upon our President. There are some tasks that we cannot delegate to others. Women have to bear our children; they cannot turn that job over to anyone else. Watching our principal officials and insisting that they act in our interest—that is a task that we simply cannot delegate to anyone else. We have to pay that price—in time, in work, in worry—if we are going to have democratic government.

Some people are not willing to pay that price. They would rather take it easy and let the President or some other public leader make the important decisions without criticism from Congress or the general public. They have a right to prefer that kind of system, but it is not democracy they are asking for.

I think that a good many people take the position I have just indicated because they are not in sympathy with the third characteristic of democracy that I noted at the beginning: they do not want our government to do things which accord with the wishes of the general public. They do not want to give up the privileges which they have. They call poor people rabble and say they should not be allowed to vote. And they do this because they are afraid that poor people will pass laws that cut in on the advantages which they have got or hope to get. This is also an understandable attitude for men to take. But when one supports lines of action that he knows to be contrary to

the basic and firmly established will of the great majority of people, he is being undemocratic as I use the term.

It ought to be clear by now that I think the American people are in a position where they can easily lose their democratic ways of governing themselves. I hope I have made it clear that I think this would be disastrous. If there is any doubt on that point, let it be removed now. If we give up our democratic form of government, I do not see how we can ever be sure of preserving any of the things we value. If we give up our democratic methods of government, we throw away our best means of guaranteeing every other thing we count important.

Most people, I hope, are as concerned as I to see our democratic ways strengthened. I cannot here say much about how we can go about doing that. Two things, however, must be said.

First, we must take the time and give the effort necessary to understand our problems. It is perfectly obvious that we cannot make those who govern us do what we want them to do unless we ourselves know what we want. That means that we must develop an interest in public problems and talk them over with other people. By talking things over with one another we not only come to know what we value ourselves, but we learn how strongly other people feel on the same matters. Soon we are in a position to compromise a little when we need to.

And that is not the sole value of organizing ourselves in groups and talking about our political and governmental problems. As people see one another and listen to one another, they acquire a basis for judging one another. *A* comes to believe that *B* is sensible and fairminded, that *C* is trying to feather his own nest, and that *D* is a crackpot. *A* tells his opinion to others. So judgments are formed. So confidences are developed. So

men come to be leaders in the community—because others have concluded or have heard that they can be trusted with power.

That suggests the *second* thing that we must do. We must provide places where political leadership can be established and developed. Democratic government is not action by mobs. It is action by men who understand what others want and who feel an obligation to do what others want.

Some men will live up to their obligations because they have developed a body of moral standards—because they have a conscience. But we cannot depend on the characters of men to give us the kind of government we want. Men who have no consciences use all their resources to barge into every position that promises something to be gained. And there are few places where the pickings are any better than in public offices. So we have to set up devices for keeping thieves and racketeers out of our public offices, or to hold them in check when they succeed in getting in.

There is nothing we can depend upon more securely for achieving this objective than a principle of competition for power. We may enact criminal laws to punish those who graft. We may provide systems of accounts and require independent audits to see that our money is spent right. But always the enforcement of these laws is in the hands of men who are in public office. And those who are in power will sabotage or wreck all these devices and controls if there are not other strong men who are in a position to challenge them and force them out of office. In the long run we have to look to political leaders to deliver us from political leaders—politicians to rescue us from politicians. It must be this way. I do not know who is to wrest power from a group of men working hand in hand under competent leadership, except another group of men work-

ing hand in hand under competent leadership. Men in office, I am afraid, are going to stay in office unless they are opposed by men who also have power.

And where are those potential opponents to develop their strength? First of all, in the thousands of communities throughout the nation. There the political leader must first reveal his qualities and win a following. There—in the community—he must gain a position of power from which he can defy those in more powerful positions, who would liquidate him before he becomes a menace to them and their ambitions. If the local leader has under his control a city government or a parish government, with streets to be constructed, a health program to be advanced, other functions to be performed, he may hope to maintain the confidence of a number of people, to keep himself before the public, to grow in prestige, to rise to the point where some day he may successfully challenge those in the seats of the mighty. If local self-government is destroyed, if pockets of power are drained out, if the local leader has no opportunity to show people what he can do, the principal foundation for democracy is gone.

Another point at which leadership is established and expressed is in our legislative assemblies. If the history of Western political systems teaches us anything about the ways of democratic people, it teaches us that an independent, courageous, aggressive, and informed representative assembly is absolutely necessary to the maintenance of popular government. It is no accident that the rise of representative assemblies in Europe was accompanied by the downfall of monarchy. It is no accident that the rise of dictatorship in Europe in our time has been accompanied by the atrophy of legislatures. Without exception, democratic peoples bring together at the seat of the govern-

ment the chief competitors for political power and prestige. There in representative assembly they make the basic policies of the country, constantly criticize those in the seats of authority, and feed out to the people the knowledge about affairs of government which permits intelligent action by the electorate. We have no choice, if we want to maintain democratic government in America, but to encourage and strengthen our legislative assemblies.

I have set no easy task for those who would strengthen and fortify our democratic foundation. It involves time, and work, and worry. It is a challenge which I hope we will meet. Surely a nation of people that is willing to invest resources valued in billions of dollars, surely a nation that is ready to send its young men to die on the field of battle that the last stronghold of democracy may be preserved, surely a people so devoted to democratic ways and democratic institutions will make the lesser sacrifice of study and thought and consultation and action which is vital to a democratic process.

Fascism, Communism, and Democracy: A Contrast

ALEX B. DASPIT

YOU all know the story that used to be told to illustrate President Coolidge's laconic nature. Returning from a two-hour sermon he was quizzed by his wife. "What did the preacher talk about?" she asked. "Sin." "Well, what did he say?" "He was against it." It seems to me that that about sums up the attitude of most of us toward communism and fascism, the supreme sins against democracy. It would seem, though, that if larger and larger parts of the congregation took to sinning, the remaining faithful might begin to think that exhortation in the ways of righteousness is not enough, and might be moved to inquire what it is that tempts men to court perdition. In fact, an interest in saving our own souls should cause us to inquire what are the weaknesses which make us liable to temptation, and to analyze the devilish wiles which have persuaded others to succumb.

These religious metaphors I have chosen deliberately, because it seems to me that ultimately communism, fascism, and democracy must be considered on the level of faiths—not as just so

many techniques by which men can be governed with greater or less efficiency, but as formulations of belief concerning conflicting ways of life. Communism, fascism, democracy. You can say these words over to any of half a billion people in the world, and they will probably evoke an emotional response as deep and meaningful as any purely religious symbol. And this is a fact we may as well face: only when democracy loses its appeal as an affirmation of a way of life that seems significant and fundamentally satisfying will short cuts to salvation, the prescriptions of political witch doctors, make headway.

For a hundred years, until only yesterday, democracy has been on the march. Kings and emperors trembled before its approach. It sounded a call to a new life of freedom, of greater opportunities for development, of broader horizons. Tyrannies would be abolished; and man, free at last, would become master of his own destiny. This was the faith that animated Thomas Jefferson as he wrote the Declaration of Independence; the faith of Mazzini as he sounded the call for Italian freedom; of Victor Hugo defying Napoleon III; of Charles James Fox; of Abraham Lincoln; of millions of common men the world over who caught the vision and were fired to faith.

As a political faith, it assumed a certain fundamental equality among men; a certain reasonableness; a willingness to discuss differences, and an ability to resolve them peaceably; a hatred of despotic authority, but a capacity for self-discipline. The political institutions in which this faith was crystallized were the free ballot, representative assemblies, government by law, the guarantee of minority rights, of which perhaps the most important of all was the right to criticize.

Democracy thus conceived found its devoted followers in all civilized countries of the world. In spite of setbacks they

remained confident of ultimate victory. And there was always a refuge in the United States, where the vision seemed very close, and where for a century it remained a beacon of hope for the abject and oppressed everywhere.

The achievements of this system were not trifling. It broadened education and in the more advanced democratic countries virtually eliminated illiteracy. It created a more humane attitude toward criminals, the insane, the unfortunates of society. It developed side by side with the technological revolution which made available to millions a standard of living previously possible to only a handful of aristocrats. It gave to common men a sense of independence, of individual worth and dignity, of satisfactory achievement such as has rarely been accorded them in history.

These were some of its notable accomplishments. But unfortunately there was more to the story than this. Democracy, from its beginnings, became identified with a particular form of economic organization called capitalism—that is, a form of production requiring large investments in factories, machinery, turbines, tools, dies, and so on, control of which remained in the hands of private individuals. This control, it was assumed for many generations, must be absolute. To private men must be left the task of exploiting the natural resources of the earth and accumulating wealth by all methods short of the penal code.

As time went on, democracy came more and more to be measured in material terms. It was good because it was the form of government under which men got rich. In addition to piling up wealth, the capitalist system with which democracy became identified had certain other effects. It created the industrial metropolis, for example. Millions of people were

uprooted from the small rural communities where they had a settled and comfortable sense of belonging, and moved to the city to tend machines and become "denizens of vast, bleak, anonymous slums." The fabric of social life was rent in fragments. Men ceased to be men and became factory hands, so many tools for the production of wealth. They ceased to be united by the ties of blood, of community, of religious experience, and became bound to each other only by a chain of dollar marks. Under a system based on a theory of equality, enormous economic inequality developed. Under a system committed to the principle of freedom, people became enslaved by poverty. Under a system professing good will among men, mutual understanding, and the settlement of disputes by peaceful and rational agreement, grew gigantic international wars.

Communism and fascism grew out of the failure of a capitalistic, materialistic, depersonalized society to give to men a sense of community of purpose, a feeling of security and personal significance which comes from knowing one's place, doing one's job, and sharing one's experience with others; and a positive creed which provides a rational pattern for human behavior. The leaders of the revolutionary movements take advantage of the weakening of habitual loyalties to a system which to many of its members seems no longer a going concern, to offer an alternative formula—a new idea which promises a better ordering of things and calls the loyalties of men to a new statement of faith.

It is only when the old ways of life break down, when a sense of desperation and radical insecurity begins to dominate human lives, when a feeling grows among men that they are the helpless victims of blind and irrational forces completely beyond their control that men voluntarily release all claim to

freedom and to reasoned judgment, for the privilege of believing and of being led.

Communism and fascism are alternative prescriptions for salvation. Neither made headway until the disintegration of the old society had been rendered acute by the war. And they were embraced by men made desperate by chronic turmoil and instability.

Realizing this, the leaders of both schools concentrate on the task of increasing instability and tension within a country. The communists preach the irreconcilable nature of the class conflict, deny the possibility of any peaceful resolution of the struggle between capitalist and worker, and incite the proletarian to revolt. The fascist attempts to use the Jew as his entering wedge. If one class in the community can be set apart, to which the democratic principles of equality and good will do not apply, then the element of disintegration has been introduced in the body of democratic principles. In addition, wherever fascists and communists become sufficiently strong, they embark on a program of systematic violence, designed to make men so desperately insecure that they will embrace despotism to escape anarchy.

The aims the movements profess by no means describe them. The communist invokes the image of a classless society from which poverty, crime, war, and injustice have been completely eliminated by the simple expedient of abolishing private property. As a vision to inspire the revolutionist, this concept is of the greatest importance. As a description of the state of affairs brought to pass within Russia since 1917, it is worthless. The dominant emphasis has had to be on the *method* by which this end is to be achieved, and the *end* itself comes no closer. For practical purposes, communism in operation becomes restricted

to the method, and this is simply dictatorship, which applies totalitarian propaganda and unstinted force to the suppression of private property, the control of religion, the supervision of education, and the regimentation of every aspect of human life.

The fascist does not paint so roseate a picture of the world he intends to make; at any rate, his Utopia is a much narrower and more exclusive one. Its vision is of a conquering race-nation of superior culture, led by an inspired Fuehrer, or Duce, to a position of domination in the world—or some very large part of the world. This nation of conquerors is to be composed of individuals who have an assured place, definite obligations, and a sense of belonging to a regime which is making history.

In practice, the two systems have come more and more closely to resemble each other. The practical effectiveness of communism derives from its appeal to the will to believe in the possibility of the creation of a better and a fairer world, and this has tended to become belief in the supreme wisdom and power of the party leader. At the same time, the growing necessity of Russia to defend itself against hostile powers has produced an increasing emphasis on nationalism and military might. These are characteristics we associate with fascism.

Fascism, in the beginning, was at least partially a reaction on the part of the middle class against the threat of communism, but the inexorable demands of the war machine have more and more subordinated all private property to the control of the state; so that, whereas the title to property remains with private individuals, the control over its use has been so reduced as to become in many cases almost nonexistent. Thus has fascism approximated communism.

Both movements discard as worthless the fundamental values

for which democracy stands. Both are irrevocably committed to the unstinted use of force. The dictators of either school brook no opposition; they tolerate no criticism; they strive to harness every individual to an unremitting service to the state more exacting than the machines of capitalism have ever demanded, and so exhaust all men as to leave neither will nor desire to question. "Both of them," writes one embittered refugee, "raise the state to the rank of deity by humiliating men to the level of animals who are not supposed to think but only to work for being fed."

The fascists and the communists alike seek our destruction. Salvation can come only from a rediscovery of the valid bases of our democratic creed. It must be cut free from the inconsistencies and the weaknesses with which it has been undermined. We shall be able to save ourselves from the external dangers which beset us only by rediscovering at home the sources of our ancient strength and resolution. Democracy must become a fighting faith again, capable of the type of achievement which calls forth the abiding loyalties and high devotion of men.

Democracy's Strength

LYNN CASE

EVER since the advent of Mussolini in 1922 as a dictator of Italy, democracy has been under fire. When the dictators have not been attacking democracies by military force, they have engaged in vicious campaigns of vilification. You can tune in on almost any shortwave broadcast and hear Hitler, Goebbels, Goering, or Mussolini raucously shout their denunciations of democracy. In his loud and hysterical speeches Goebbels tells the world that "democracy is finished," that it "reeks of putrefaction," that it is "too cowardly to attack."[1] In France, where victory was won under a democracy in 1918, Laval blames democracy for the defeat in 1940. "Democracy," he snarls, "has lost and it must pay the price. France must abjure an ideology which brought her to her downfall. She should fear the day when Petain might die and she might be tempted to go back to the weaknesses and chaos of the parliamentary regime."[2]

The purpose of such violent attacks on democracy by the totalitarian leaders is largely to undermine morale in the demo-

[1] *New York Times,* July 10, 1937; July 30, 1938; May 2, 1939.

[2] Jean Montigny, *Toute la vérité sur un mois dramatique de notre histoire* (Clermont-Ferrand: Editions Mont-Louis, 1940), p. 54.

cratic countries. The attackers try to make democracy the scapegoat for bad conditions or defeats, when the real causes of those conditions may sometimes be traced to the ineptitude of the military leaders or to the way a certain economic system functions. The real causes of failure in a democratic country might exist in any other political system. However, if the dictators are able to lay the blame on the democratic political system, they can bring about further disruption of the very machinery which must be used to combat them. We, therefore, citizens in a democracy, must be prepared to make our minds a battlefield where we can fight against the insidious totalitarian attacks on our morale. Our mental defenses must be armed with knowledge of the past, for the past reveals that democracies can be strong and that dictatorial regimes can crumble overnight. It is the purpose, therefore, of this discussion to give the democratic citizen a broader perspective so that he will not succumb to the deliberate falsifications and distortions of Nazi and fascist propaganda.

Since the common people usually shun war and a democracy is responsive to the wishes of the people, democratic states are reluctant to prepare for war or even to go to war when their very existence is threatened. Thus it often happens, as with England, that the democratic state, if it wins the war, has to lose many a battle before the final victory. It is the hope of the dictators, however, that the morale of the democracies will crack before the final battle is fought.

Yet democracies do win many a last battle and many a war because their morale is higher and more enduring. This superiority of morale, in my opinion, is attributable to the fact that the democratic form of government corresponds to the higher aspirations of the human race. Man is a social animal, and he

also seeks for himself freedom of action and expression. Democracy, compared to any other form of government, offers to men the most equalitarian association with one another, combined with the maximum of liberty for the individual. Once these values are realized, democracy itself becomes an inspiring ideal to the democratic citizen. His morale is higher because he is fighting for an ideal. He will stay in the fight through thick and thin. Bad news can not eradicate the vision splendid; indeed, bad news often spurs him on to greater effort.

But what about the charge that a democracy has to become a dictatorship to wage a war? That is a typical anti-democratic distortion. There is a lot of difference between an emergency war-regime in a democracy and a permanent dictatorship. In wartime a democracy may postpone elections, may grant dictatorial powers to its executive, may even suspend *habeas corpus* and temporarily keep certain military secrets from the public. But so long as the ideal of the executive and the people is the return to peacetime democratic practice, no violence is done to the democratic principle. Lincoln and Wilson both wielded great war powers which were returned to the people and to the Congress as soon as the war was over. Churchill's war powers today are very different from the powers of Hitler and Mussolini; they are different because of the difference of attitude of Churchill and the British people toward the permanency of those war powers.

So far, however, I have been talking in generalities. In terms of more specific examples, just how effective is democracy in meeting a wartime emergency? Well, as Al Smith used to say, let's look at the record. We might look at America's record in the First World War for an informative beginning. How

dead was the American democracy in 1917? Professor Hayes of Columbia University has something to say to us about that:

> It became obvious that Germany had miscalculated the time required for the United States to intervene actively in the war. For the United States lost no time in collecting vast sums of money, in gathering and training a large army, and in mobilizing industries and resources. Considering the manifold difficulties and handicaps, the task as a whole was achieved with surprising efficiency and dispatch.[3]

Every important American historian agrees with the testimony of Professor Hayes. That autocratic Germany was robbed of her victory in 1918 can be attributed largely to the speed and efficiency of democratic America's war effort.

If we turn from America in 1917 to the British democracies today, we find that they have put forth an even greater effort with astounding results. The manufacture of planes, guns, and tanks, the training of an air force, the mobilizing of the total population for all kinds of service have moved along with scarcely a hitch. Certainly no one can witness the British fortitude in the evacuation of Dunkirk, in the terrific air-raids over London and Coventry, or in the battles of sky, sea, and desert and attribute any softness, any decadence, or any putrefaction to British democracy. As a matter of fact, Goebbels's propaganda channels have forewarned the German people that the defeat of Britain would be a long, hard job. That's just one example of the many inconsistencies of the dictatorial news machine.

Indeed, we do not have to look to Anglo-Saxon democracies for all the examples of fortitude. Nothing in all the annals of democracy has yet equaled the glorious record of the Finns in their struggle against Soviet Russia. Three million democratic

[3] Carleton J. H. Hayes, *A Brief History of the World War* (New York, 1920), p. 222.

people held off the attack of 168 million pawns of a dictator. They actually won victories, in the most difficult kind of weather, against these terrific odds. No one, now or in the future, in Russia or in Germany, will even dare to insinuate that Finland lost that war because she was soft, diseased, or cowardly.

Just as history can show a splendid record for democracies, it can also show a sorry record for autocracies and dictatorships. One of the earliest streamlined dictatorships of modern times, that of Napoleon I, collapsed within seven years after its completion. The same fate was in store for his nephew, Napoleon III, who established a second empire in France in 1852. After eighteen years of his so-called dictatorial efficiency and excellency Napoleon III's political structure fell to pieces in 1870 under circumstances of ridiculous unpreparedness. Note what the French historian, Seignobos, admits in his caustic account of the Franco-Prussian War:

> Napoleon III's government thought they could put 350,000 men in the field when they actually had less than 250,000. These, too, were grouped into incomplete regiments, badly provisioned, and entirely disrupted by the lack of previous organization into brigades, divisions, and army corps. Generals arrived without knowing the number of their regiments. One general telegraphed: 'Arrived at Belfort. No brigade here. What shall I do?' The major-general wired to the War Office, 'Where are my divisions?'

> The Second Empire, imposed on France by a military Coup d'Etat, had no other support save the army. The nation did not become imperialist and contributed nothing to the regime unless it was a deadening inertia. When the army disappeared the Empire crumbled without a fight in the face of a mere show of force by the people. Its leaders fled abroad, no one stood up in its defense.[4]

[4] Charles Seignobos in Ernest Lavisse (ed.), *Histoire de France Contemporaine* (Paris, 1921), VII, 230, 248.

All the king's horses and all the king's men could never put this humpty-dumpty together again.

But there were other humpty-dumpty regimes which had their great falls elsewhere. Take, for instance, the great empire of the Czar, the autocrat of all the Russians. If there is any virtue in tyranny and if time can enhance its virtues further, then certainly Czarist Russia should be a model of strength and efficiency. Yet read Professor Hayes's objective evaluation:

> Autocracy of the Russian variety proved itself absolutely unfit to meet the supreme test of the Great War. Such was its corruption and inefficiency that rather early in the struggle Russia had lost to the foreign foe more men and more territory than any other Great Power. And such was the obtuseness of the Russian autocracy that it would learn no lesson from military defeat and would brook no honest criticism of its own conduct. Throughout the winter of 1916-1917 popular disaffection overspread Russia. Army officers complained of the lack of government energy in prosecuting the war. The middle classes complained of silly government restrictions on trade and industry. Landlords complained of absurd government restrictions on the export of grain from one district to another. Peasants groaned under an intolerable system of economic and political abuses. Workingmen in the towns suffered from a shortage of food and a general paralysis of business.[5]

Such was the background of the fall of Czarist Russia in 1917.

Coming down closer to our own time we have the classic example of dictatorial failure. In 1922 Mussolini came to power in Italy as the exponent of the "hard" life and the virtues of war. For eighteen years he had a chance to mobilize the whole nation and build up a formidable war machine. And then, what happened? His forces were defeated in Albania by the little Greek nation; his army of 200,000 was defeated in Libya by a British army of 30,000; the Italian forces in Eritrea and

[5] Hayes, *World War*, p. 225.

Ethiopia have been crushed; and on the seas the Italian navy has been badly mauled.

When we hear the propaganda of demoralization from the dictators or their fellow-travellers, we have the satisfaction of knowing the records of success and failure in the annals of history; and in those annals democracy's record of ability and endurance surpasses by far the score attained by tyranny.

> There is a comfort in the strength of love;

wrote Wordsworth,

> 'Twill make a thing endurable, which else
> Would overset the brain, or break the heart.

It is that "strength of love"— love of liberty, love of free government, love of one's own free people—that is the miraculous power of democracies in their battle against dictatorships. It is that democratic "strength of love" which will yet prove to be one of the strongest bulwarks against the assaults of Hitler's artificial "strength through joy."

II

SOCIETY:
COMMERCE AND THE HOME

Citizens' Groups in Democratic and Totalitarian States

MELVIN G. DAKIN

IT WOULD be useless to attempt to include here a résumé of the activities of all citizens' groups in democratic and fascist countries. It might be more useful, rather, to single out a kind of citizens' group which has been increasingly the subject of comment, adverse and favorable, in recent years and compare its progress under democracy and under fascism. The kind of citizens' group which I refer to is the organized consumer-group operating its own cooperative society for the distribution of goods and services. Tracing the development of these societies is tracing the progress of living, breathing economic democracy. That this is so is evidenced by the fact that one of the first steps taken by the dictators upon seizing power was to hamstring their activities by every possible device and finally to take them over altogether.

Before I begin that story, however, I should first make clear what I mean by a cooperative society. To many of you its organization is already familiar. To others the cooperative is a

new phenomenon. The origin of the principles on which the cooperative society is based is traced back to a little group of factory workers in the town of Rochdale, England. Hapless victims of a changing technology, this early band of organized consumers decided to pool their meager resources and attempt to supply themselves in more abundance with the goods and services necessary for their daily existence. Unsophisticated as they were, they hit upon a happy combination of principles for organized enterprise which not only worked for them but have come to be the foundation stone of the cooperative movement. These were the principles: (1) absolute democracy of control: one member had one vote, regardless of number of shares owned; (2) limited return to capital: on all shares a return was to be paid in keeping with the minimum rate at which capital could be secured; (3) return to the members of all income over and above necessary reserves, or, in the alternative, the use of such excess income for the purpose of improving the economic well-being of the members. From that humble beginning and on the basis of these principles has grown a network of cooperative societies reaching into every country in the world and numbering more than 130,000,000 people among its members, a million and a half of whom are here in the United States.

Why is a consideration of cooperative societies and the principles upon which they operate pertinent in a discussion of citizenship in a democracy? My answer would be that the cooperative society has been the citizen's reply to concentrated economic power in its attempt to dictate, here and elsewhere in the world, what the citizen shall buy and what he shall pay for what he buys. Something of the story of cooperative societies in Sweden is known to all of you. Late in the 1800's through the cartel system, huge corporations, often interna-

tional in scope, came to exercise virtual monopoly over trade in the principal commodities and maintained often extortionate prices. Here in the United States the citizen's answer was to prevail upon Congress to pass the Sherman Anti-Trust Act; to rely, that is, upon his political power to keep these corporate forces in check. We know now that passing a law was not the answer; power has continued to be concentrated in the hands of our great corporate interests despite our anti-trust legislation. The Swedish citizens had a different and far more effective answer. They resorted not to political organization but to economic organization. The few struggling cooperative societies then in existence were recognized as weapons with which the citizen could counter the threat to economic democracy. By the organized purchasing power which consumers, through their retail societies, were able to bring to bear upon the monopolists, the monopoly control over one commodity after another was broken. Where necessary, the societies, through their central organization, entered the field of production. One of their earliest victories was thus achieved over the margarine trust. Voluntary contributions from retail societies enabled the central organization to construct a small plant. Its operation conclusively demonstrated (1) that the societies could enter the production field and meet the competition of the monopolists, (2) that the product could be made and sold substantially below the trusts' prices, and (3) that with an uncontrollable competitor in the field the monopolists had to reduce their prices to all consumers.

The story does not stop with the production of margarine, however. In Sweden the cooperative wholesale has gone on into the manufacture of flour, shoes, galoshes, and other basic necessities. Now included is the production of electric light bulbs,

a step which broke the power of the "lamp trust" throughout Europe and included a sortie against the European affiliate of our General Electric Company. Wherever concentrated economic control sought to exact a price which was unreasonable, the cooperative societies stepped into competition with that concentrated control. The organized citizens of Sweden have refused to be pushed around by the use of economic power concentrated, through the corporate device, in a few hands at the top of the system. They have chosen rather to use the same device, the corporation, to meet that threat—a corporate body, stripped however of those features which have made it the ready weapon that it is for the control of economic power. The cooperative societies say, not one vote per share of capital, but one vote per member, thus taking away the incentive for groups to control large blocks of stock by ownership; they say, not voting by proxy, but voting only in person, thus making it impossible for management of the society to dominate the society by the use of proxies; and finally they say, not unlimited returns to the suppliers of capital, but a rate of return commensurate with the risk undertaken; not concentration of profits solely in the hands of those who own large shareholdings, but distribution of some of their earnings to those who by their patronage have made those earnings possible.

The threat which such organized citizen-effort constitutes to concentrated economic control is clearly evident in the treatment which the societies received in Germany after the great corporate interests helped to place the Nazis in power. The German consumers' cooperative societies were vigorous and progressive. By the development of their own production and expansion of their services, the consumers' societies and their central organizations had become an important factor in German economic

life, especially in the large cities and in the industrial districts. Through their price policies they were able to influence the general level of prices in many parts of the country. During and after the war the movement weathered revolution, political crisis, runaway inflation, and depression.

The Nazis, even before gaining power, however, did everything possible to hinder the operation of the societies. The animosity which small traders would naturally harbor towards any competitor was fanned by the Nazis and directed against the societies, thus drawing off the fire which might otherwise have been directed against the great corporations, many of which were contributing to the Nazi party. The Nazis once in power, the attack continued and culminated with the taking over of the societies by the German Labor Front. The Director of the "Front," which might better be characterized as the "affront," ordered no further development of the societies and further directed that there be no more voting in any of the societies. Henceforth they would be a part of the new "corporate" order. Their subsequent decline was inevitable: economic democracy had no place in a regime placed in power by concentrated economic interests at the top. The same story was repeated with the Austrian cooperatives after the Anschluss of March, 1938, and with the Czechoslovakian cooperatives beginning with the annexation of Sudetenland in October, 1938. While we have no information about the fate of the societies in the countries which have been overrun by the Nazis since the outbreak of war, there is no reason to suppose that they have fared better.

The outcome has not been altogether a happy one, however, for the monopolists who helped to bring the Nazis to power. They sought to preserve their power by buying protection from

gangsters, only to find that after they had obtained relief from democratic pressure they themselves were liquidated. We have seen the corporate dictators one by one forced to flee Europe. The outcome of the contest for control from the bottom and control from the top has thus been in Germany the rise to power of an all-powerful government which dictates ruthlessly to both the top and the bottom. Compare this with what is being accomplished in Sweden. The same great corporate interests threatened here also, but the citizens were prepared for that threat. Sweden had had time for its citizens to learn how to conduct themselves so effectively, in an economic way, that the great interests were unable to take them over, directly or through the use of a totalitarian party. The citizens had learned how to govern themselves through their own cooperative societies and through the organization of workers in all parts of the economy. The government had permitted the rise of oppressive monopolies without attempting to check them. Sweden has no anti-trust laws. Prices were allowed to rise to unreasonable levels, and cartels were allowed to boycott the societies first struggling into existence. The result was that the citizens were stimulated to cooperative activity to an unprecedented degree. They discovered that they did not need to resort to governmental regulation of business, that through their voluntary associations they could do their own regulating. If efficient and reasonably priced service is not obtainable from a producer, the citizens, through their cooperative societies, enter the field as producers themselves. Furthermore, their strength is such that they can act through the government, if need be, by public ownership of essentially public businesses. Thus has cooperative democracy come to its full flower in Sweden. What they

have, they made for themselves; and it cannot be taken away by the withdrawal of the paternal hand of government.

But do we need to learn from Sweden? Do we have that concentration of corporate control which goaded the Swedes to cooperative action? Recent findings by a Congressional committee indicate that we do. Sixty to sixty-five per cent of the total volume of business done in the United States is done by privately held corporations. Agriculture alone is the only business which is still carried on predominantly by private individuals. It would not be alarming to learn of this concentration of wealth in the hands of corporations if it were not for the fact that concentration is progressing within the corporate structure into the hands of a relative handful of economic giants. The 394 largest corporations, in 1937, although they constituted less than 1/10 of 1% of the total number of corporations, owned almost 45% of all corporate assets. Of the corporations reporting income for 1937, 248, or 1/10 of 1%, had 40% of the total net income that was reported by all. Corporations having assets of a billion dollars or more each have increased from 6 in 1919 to 26 at the end of 1938. Each of these 248 corporations had an income of $5,000,000 or over. This too would perhaps not be alarming if it were not accompanied by the further finding that payment of dividends of these corporations is also highly concentrated. In a study of the 200 largest non-financial corporations, prepared by the Securities and Exchange Commission, it is indicated that fully one-half of all corporate dividends are received by fewer than 75,000 persons of the 130,000,000 persons who inhabit the United States. That is to say, less than 1% of all American corporate stockholders are the beneficiaries of one-half of all the dividends paid in this country. The bulk of the saving, as would be expected, is also done by the large

corporations and their owners. These savings flow into concentrated geographical areas and in recent years have tended to concentrate in investment in government obligations. Clearly the result of this continued concentration is that an increasingly smaller part of the population has an increasingly larger voice in the economic affairs of the country and holds an increasingly larger share of the obligations of the government. The small-scale business man is being slowly but surely crushed out, along with the people he has served. One may well ask whether a government can regulate effectively those upon whom it is so largely dependent for funds. Rather, must the process culminate in a government pledged to do the bidding of the great corporations but ultimately, as in Germany, doing the bidding only of itself? Senator O'Mahoney, in his final statement for the committee, made this significant remark: "The representatives of business, as well as the representatives of government, those who are engaged in agriculture, those who are engaged in industry, all are vitally concerned and it must be perfectly clear that any remedy which does not stop the steady progress of concentration will be utterly futile and will end only in an all-powerful government. If we want to remedy these obvious ills, we'd better stop scolding one another and begin to cooperate."

The task, then, is to check the drain of economic power into the hands of those corporate interests which already have more of this world's goods and more of this power than is well in a democracy which proposes to continue in the democratic path. The cooperative society, as a democratic citizens' group, offers a way that has been found successful in Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway, and to a lesser extent in England. It would be futile, however to believe that at this late date cooperative societies can solve the problem unaided. Government regulation

must be relied upon to cope with the present concentration which has been permitted to develop. The cooperative democracy of Sweden did not come about without long years of preparation; it will take equally long years here in the United States. We have made a substantial start; there are nearly a million and a half members in cooperative societies of one kind or another throughout the country. There are 7,000 cooperative credit societies (credit unions) presently demonstrating that cooperation works. On the framework which we have, can we build a democratic bulwark against a runaway corporate economy with control concentrated too highly at the top? The small, independent business man is powerless in the face of the forces which he opposes. The consumer citizens, on the other hand, collectively possess the strength for the task. The same device through which concentration has been achieved, the corporation, is available for the effort. Operated on cooperative principles by consumers, the corporation is returned to that democratic form in which it was originally intended to operate. Those democratic common-law principles all have been abandoned. Control on the basis of shares owned has replaced the democratic principle of equal power to each member, and management by proxy has replaced voting in person. We need a return to democratic principles of corporate control and to a use of the corporation which will be of maximum benefit to the community. The cooperative society has provided the means in Sweden—it has made the consumer a citizen in an economic democracy.

Private Enterprise in a Democracy

STEPHEN A. CALDWELL

THE terms *democracy* and *private enterprise* do not mean the same thing; but, if we think of private enterprises as being competitive, one cannot exist without the other. Any business or professional unit is an enterprise: a farm, a store, a factory, a power plant, or the business of a lawyer or a doctor. When a person or persons own the property necessary to operate enterprises, we have private enterprise.

In a democracy such enterprises are competitive and form the economic backbone of the country. It is through them that laborers find work and the government gets its taxes. Since private business is run for profit, competition is necessary to keep entrepreneurs from exploiting the public. Competition, however, does not always work perfectly. Governments, therefore, must guard and protect it. In this country it was found, under the Articles of Confederation, that states set up high tariffs which prevented goods from going from one state to another. The framers of the Constitution, therefore, found it necessary to insert the clause providing that Congress control commerce among the states. Certain types of businesses are

monopolistic by nature. The railroads, telephones, telegraph, water systems, power systems are of this type. Here, too, it is necessary for the government to impose regulations to force such concerns to operate competitively. It is one of the functions of a democratic government to maintain private enterprise on a competitive basis. To do this requires that officials have high intelligence and broad experience; for, if the government steps into private business too far, it may destroy a fundamental part of national life; and, on the other hand, if monopolistic enterprises are permitted to go unchecked, that same fundamental may be destroyed.

Private enterprise is based upon the institution of private property. If the people do not respect private property, a democracy cannot prosper; for without protection people will not stint themselves in order to save the capital necessary to operate the enterprises. A democracy, in order to build up private enterprises and maintain itself, must protect private property.

There are other ways in which productive enterprises may be carried on. The government may own the capital and direct the operation of all its productive units. In that case there would be no democracy and no competitive private enterprise. A great many people claim that a democracy is inefficient, that is to say, that private enterprise is inefficient. This statement is only partially true. When it comes to the organization of the whole people of a nation for immediate action, the process may be slower in a democracy than in other forms of government. It might also be true that a monopoly could render more efficient service for a while than competitive private enterprises. On the other hand, when it comes to those long-time efficiencies

that build up and maintain a civilization, competitive enterprise is far more efficient than other types.

History is filled with the stories of the rise and fall of civilizations. In practically every case the people were regimented under a control which did not permit the rise of new and independent industries. The people of the Western Roman Empire built up a great civilization; but when their greatest resource, the soil, began to weaken, the people were forced to cultivate it under supervision in order, as was thought, to secure more efficiency. A system of private enterprise, however, might have developed other sources of income. Such other sources were found by the people of the Byzantine or Eastern Roman Empire. They turned to commerce, upon which they built and sustained for a thousand years the leading civilization of the world. But this nation, like its Western sister long before, was not willing to permit its people to continue to find new resources and activities which would enable them to secure the increased revenues necessary to maintain a growing population. Instead, they extorted higher and higher profits for their trade until the exploited people of Western Europe became aroused and found new trade routes to the East. Thus the doom of another civilization came about as a result of a centralized government which regulated in the name of efficiency.

The Western Civilization is the result of competitive private enterprise and democracy developing together. From its very beginning to the present time, of course, there have been strenuous efforts to keep down competition. Fortunately, however, the growing democratic spirit has not permitted competition to be completely stifled. The merchants' guilds, the craft guilds, and the mercantile system fell one by one because, under the

growing spirit of freedom, they were not able to stop competition among private enterprises.

Any civilization which is built upon some group of resources which are exhaustible must face one of two alternatives. The first is that, with the gradual exhaustion of the basic resources, the civilization must go down. The second alternative is that the people find new basic resources and shift to them before it is too late. This shifting requires freedom of thought, private enterprise working on a competitive basis, and a democratic government. Regimentation for efficiency may improve old industries; it cannot, however, find new ones without some form of competition. It has been said, and truthfully so, that progress is made during wars. This is true because a nation is under its greatest competitive strain while at war. It may, therefore, make advancements while its people are regimented, but the new things come from national competition with external forces. When peace is restored, a democracy must be able to re-establish its freedom and internal private competitive enterprise. The outside competition which exists in wartime makes it possible for a democracy through regimentation to secure the greatest immediate efficiency; but when the war is over, a democracy must return to internal competition in order to secure long-time progress.

This matter of competition among industries is too important to be passed over briefly, for it stimulates energetic minds to search out and find new methods and means as well as discover new industries that will give the public more for less money. Take, for example, the aluminum industry. For more than fifty years people were finding cheaper methods of producing aluminum; and, as long as competition existed, the price of aluminum fell with the cost. Not a hundred years ago the

price of aluminum was far greater than that of sterling silver, but through improved methods of production the price came down to about twenty cents a pound. This low price was attained some twenty-five years ago, at which time the aluminum industry fell under the control of a monopoly. Then for some time the price remained about twenty cents a pound. Recently competition in the aluminum industry has appeared from several sources. Improvements in the electric furnace in steelmaking have made possible the production of rustless steel, which competes with aluminum. Small bauxite companies now making fire-proof linings for furnaces are likely to begin making aluminum. The government, too, is beginning to bring pressure to break the monopoly. The very appearance of even limited competition has caused the price of aluminum to drop to seventeen cents. If competition is completely restored, we are likely to see trains and automobiles made largely of aluminum. They will be cheaper, lighter, and better than our present cars.

Private enterprise under the pressure of competition causes people to be on the alert for something new and something better. It was this very alertness that brought about the development of electrical power, of steam power, of the internal-combustion engine, of the automobile, of the airplane, of the radio, of the modernized picture-shows, and of many other things that have permitted an increasing population to live by higher and higher standards.

Much is being said about the American way of life. Competition in private industry has furnished opportunities for individuals to make their mark in this world. The method of pushing with mind and body to a successful career is part of our way of life. So much stress has been placed upon the driving

methods that a large number of people feel that the democratic ways are results of private industry. It may be, however, that private enterprise is the result rather than the cause of our ways of living; but in any case one could not exist without the other.

The other part of the American way of life is made up of a great number of habits and customs. To illustrate, one can think of a few of the customary habits which appear in home life. Each child has his or her things which are individually selected and bought. Each collection represents the individual ideas of its owner. The very house which the family occupies is the result of the ideas of those owning and living in it. The furniture and fixtures are suited to the likes and dislikes of those who inhabit the place. Each meal is composed of selected foods suited to the tastes of those consuming them. Everything about the home indicates that no foreign master has been the dictator. If someone gets sick, the family doctor is called; if legal service is needed, a lawyer is visited; if spiritual service is desired, a minister is sought after. Were it not for private enterprise, there would be no freedom in the selection of a doctor, a lawyer, or a preacher. We see churches of various denominations on every hand. Everyone attends church in accordance with his beliefs. Clubs of a thousand different kinds fill our society, and people belong to them at their own pleasure. Schoolhouses dot the land, and children as well as teachers study and speak freely on whatever topics may be suitable. Everyone goes to the town and into the stores, where many varieties of goods permit individual selections.

In order to supply these and the many other things dear to the American people, private enterprise is necessary. As a matter of fact, the American way of life and private enterprise

are comparable to Siamese Twins; one cannot exist without the other. By way of contrast to the democratic way of life, let us picture briefly what a regimented way of life would bring. The home would be in a dormitory. Each child's playthings would be like those of every other child and would be selected by a specialist. The furniture and fixtures would be of a uniform pattern designed by someone appointed for that purpose. The clothes would be uniform, and the food would be selected by some dietitian and prepared in mass fashion. The doctor and preacher would be sent, not called. There would be no freedom of the press, no religious freedom, no freedom of the ballot, and no freedom of speech.

There can be no way of life without government, and the different forms of government can be classified according to three general types. In two of the classes the beginnings may be similar: the business enterprises are owned and controlled by a few people who run them on monopolistic bases. The wealth is accumulated under central control by means of cartels or combinations. This may be called private ownership, but as a rule the owners exploit the masses by high prices and low wages until the wealth gets into the hands of so few that the masses will not stand for further exploitation. At this point either of two forms of government may supplant the old. One possibility is that a popular leader may promise the masses great things at the expense of the rich. When the rich see what is taking place, they make peace with the leader, who becomes a dictator. This is a fascist form of government, in which the enterprises may be owned privately but are controlled and operated by the dictator's government. The other possibility it that the people may completely overthrow the rich and take over all the property in the name of the state. When the state

owns and operates all the productive enterprises, there is communism. In order to unify all the interests, a dictator is set up. In the first case there is a dictator of the oligarchy for the masses. Hitler and Mussolini are examples of this type. In the second case there is a dictator of the lower class for the lower class, and the upper classes are liquidated. Stalin is the outstanding example.

The third form of government is the democracy, in which private enterprise is maintained on a competitive basis. The machine system which has revolutionized production in so many countries had its inception in and grew from private competitive enterprises. Private enterprise in a democracy builds up capital wealth and progress. There are necessarily ups and downs in every system. When a depressed period or a war comes, people, in order to get immediate efficiency, begin centralizing control. If the people are not able to go back to competitive enterprises, democracy is lost. The loss of democracy destroys long-time efficiency, and the country will soon disintegrate. Centuries may pass before another civilization can arise. Private enterprise on a competitive basis is so vital that no country, not even a democracy, can continue to maintain progress and a high standard for its people without it.

The Family as a Democratic Institution

LEE M. BROOKS

HOW does the American family fit into a framework of democracy today? For perspective, it is necessary to consider yesterday and tomorrow, and to see the family and the community together.

First of all, what is the substance of democracy? Like religion, it is more than a spoken creed; it is a balance of belief and behavior. In every thoughtful discussion of democracy, there are certain paired ingredients: People and Authority, Rights and Duties, Freedom and Effort. We hang out the welcome sign for all of them except Duties and Effort. But, just as surely as we cannot have a roof over our heads, food for our bodies, and happy family life unless we work and pay for them, we cannot expect to have democratic rights and freedom unless we put forth effort. We simply cannot toot our horns and get democracy by curb-service.

Democracy might be symbolized by a symmetrical pine tree or by an equilateral triangle under whose base is written in capital letters, People; one side inscribed, Duties; the other side inscribed, Rights. Within this triangular unity I see the

substance of authority, freedom, and cooperative effort. About democracy, so considered, there seems to be something universal, something of the very essence of nature.

The family was yesterday and it is today an institution of growth. The family produces the people. It is the first source of exercised duties and rights. It develops within itself discipline and authority; then, as the members grow, if they grow properly, there comes an expansion of freedom and cooperation, with duties and rights being shared, all coming into balance and symmetry like other things in well-ordered nature.

In the light of science and religion, I see the family as democratic unity wherein, from childhood to old age, every member's life partakes of duties, rights, and cooperative freedom.

The earliest cave man and cave woman met and mated; no dictatorial authority told them what to do, how many children to have. Two cooperating life cells, one from the man and one from the woman, fused together fifty-fifty. The child's life depended upon a continuance of shared parental responsibility and division of labor. The very origin of life suggests democracy.

This early fifty-fifty functioning got out of balance; the male gathered unto himself more and more power within the family. Even today he tends to carry over a feeling of superiority into the seats of power in business and in government. A strong reaction to male dominance did not come until the nineteenth century, until our American pioneer women had shared with their men the winning of the West. Since then many of our women have helped to win some other things on new social and democratic frontiers.

An example or two will show how relatively rapid has been the upward movement of women and children since colonial

times. Go to Saint Mary's churchyard in Bedford, England, and read this inscription on a gravestone: "Here lies interred the body of Patience, ye wife of SHADRACH JOHNSON, by her he had 12 sons and 12 daughters, she died in childbed ye 6th day of June, Anno 1717, aged 38 years." By her, *he* had! Read the righteous treatise of Cotton Mather in colonial Massachusetts: "Counsel and Comforts for Godly Parents Afflicted with Ungodly Children"; or listen to the Pilgrim preacher, John Robinson, hammering away like this: "There is in all children . . . a stubbernes and stoutnes of minde . . . which must be broken and beaten down so the foundation of their education being layd in humilitie . . . other virtues may in their time be built thereon." Children, for them, were clay or stone that had to be moulded or chiseled; not like a plant that lives and grows, in need of guiding and pruning. Then somewhat later, another voice: "Home is the palace of the husband and the father. He is the monarch of that little empire, wearing a crown that is the gift of heaven, swaying a sceptre put into his hands by the Father of all, acknowledging no superior, fearing no rival, and dreading no usurper." Not the words of a Hitler, a Stalin, or a Mussolini, but of a Boston minister in the year 1844.

Those old sturdy oaks did not always balance their Scriptural selections. They quoted such verses as: "Children, obey your parents in the Lord, for this is right." They avoided such a verse as: "Parents, provoke not your children to wrath." Even now, to a considerable extent, a detour is too often made around the greatest exponent of democratic essentials the world has ever known, Jesus of Nazareth, who revealed in a new Gospel the democratic ideal with an ever-present emphasis on quality rather than quantity.

The ideal family today stands, it seems to me, on the middle

ground between the authoritarianism of former times, when the man was the unquestioned boss, and the super-individualism practiced by some of today's families, especially some of so-called "progressive" parents and their offsprings. On the one hand, too much rigidity; on the other hand, too many disintegrative tendencies. Either of these extremes distorts freedom and the proper growth of personality.

Yet, in spite of obstruction from within and from without, the family today in our Western world is coming into fuller flower as a democratic institution where children can be heard as well as seen; where there is a parental willingness to "spare the rod and *study* the child," to study *why* Johnny and Mary transgressed rather than to try to beat Heaven into them for *what* they did; where woman is looked upon as something more than a passive creature whose fixed place is in the home to the exclusion of her participation in community affairs that have much meaning for the family.

What do young people, who will soon be marrying and starting homes of their own, think about their tomorrows? Here are some figures on certain opinions of 297 students of Louisiana State University. Among questions asked them were three that brought indicative answers:

Do you believe that complete sharing of resources should exist between mates? (Yes: men, 88%; women 89%).

Should there be 50-50 parental responsibility in the training of your children? (Yes: men, 85%; women, 96%).

Should the wife and the children have a voice in important family decisions? (Yes: men, 90%; women, 94%).

Nine out of ten students, both men and women, answer "yes" to all these questions. The women are slightly more emphatic than the men. If we are to judge from these answers, if college students can indicate their beliefs on paper, tomorrow's families

will have more democratic inclinations than the family of yesterday.

Just how well today's young people in high school and college are balancing Rights and Duties in actual practice is not known. A good many of them promise well for tomorrow's family and community life; too many of them are bewildered, but who isn't? A few of them seem to be unsocialized, individualistic slackers who think they can have their cake and eat it too. Concerning these last, it should not be forgotten that for every little problem child there is very likely a big problem situation in the home or community, or in both.

What about the family and the community? Can the family have the fullness of democracy in any community which permits conditions that are a denial of democracy, which permits the dictatorships of vested-interest minorities whose motto seems to be: "Of the dollars, by the dollars, and for the dollars"; in any community in which moneyed interests and political machines must be protected at all costs, even though democracy disintegrates as one of the costs? For example, take the housing problem so important for decency in democracy. I know at least four cities from Vermont to Louisiana which have recently refused to admit that they have any slums—a denial of cold fact. Uncle Sam makes really *good* business offers for the good of the community in an effort to reduce inequalities and dangers in housing and health, only to be met by obstruction. Thus do vested minorities dictate and endanger democracy at the very threshold of the home. Can democratic family life thrive in a slum, amid disease, where recreational space and programs are neglected? The answer is clear. It took the Federal Government a long time to aim definitely for a better balance between public wealth and public welfare. Before

Uncle Sam got busy about housing the people, he was much concerned about the housing of animals. Thin little children could stay in the dark; fat little pigs must go to market to bring home the financial bacon. Farmers' Bulletin No. 1487, year 1926, on "Practical Hog Houses," says, in part: "Proper housing is an important factor in the successful raising of hogs. If little pigs are to get the right kind of a start in life, they must have plenty of sunshine." Uncle Sam has better vision today; he is thinking more than ever of people; he is thinking of "success" as "service," not of that word *success* as being spelled with a dollar sign, a letter U, two cent-signs, a letter E, and two more dollar signs ($U¢¢E$$). He wants to help the community do better than it is inclined to do, indeed better than it can do under its own power alone. He wants to level out some of the unequal places. Others are doing it; we can do it. The Scandinavian democracies were ahead of Uncle Sam on the sunlit highway of family and public welfare, and only now is he beginning to catch up. Yet many of our local communities hang back in the shadows of things that, in a democracy, ought not to be.

It is no longer news for anyone to broadcast that democracy is in more danger than it ever has been. All the dictatorial influences are not in Europe or the Orient, however. I am not afraid of invasion by foreign dictatorships, but what does make me feel uneasy is the slacker-mindedness of so many people here in America who say that they want the fruits of democracy, yet who give little evidence that they are willing to work very hard for it in their own communities, where it is in danger of decaying on their own doorsteps. We have been having, and still are having, our individual and family rights invaded before our eyes by men who are hurting themselves and others by an abuse

of privilege and power. And we do not fight them as we should. Like Ole Man River or a climbing vine, people are crooked when they take the ways of least resistance.

We get the government we deserve; we pay the price when we neglect to invest the civic effort that means democratic freedom. If democracy is to endure, young people today will have to work harder for it than some of their elders have done. Democratic roots go deep; we hope they will have growth-power to survive the conflagration that we elders have allowed to spread. If we want a better democracy, today's parents and children *unitedly* will have to cultivate it root and branch within the family. Civic-minded families *unitedly* can do much to prune away the diseased and dying branches that hinder symmetrical growth. More than this, parents and children will have to make the needs of the family more definitely felt at the seats of local government. Democracy is ever threatened by those whose quest is for self, for pelf, and for power. Healthy democratic growth requires room, with consideration for the rights of people as a whole. It is in the home and in the local community that the citizen-to-be is swayed toward or away from effective democracy.

You and I have a right to do as we please only in so far as we are pleased to do right under the laws of God and man. Rights and duties, freedom and effort must come into better balance. Democracy comes not by wishing and waiting, but by working at it everywhere—in home, and school, and community; by seeing to it that others labor for it. If we do this, America will be secure.

III

THE REGION

The South's Contribution to American Democracy

EDWIN ADAMS DAVIS

SHORTLY after the American Revolution, Frederick the Great prophesied that the infant nation was destined to fail. The great expanse of the territory from Maine to Georgia would lead either to disintegration of the union or to the establishment of a monarchical form of government. No republic had ever existed on so grand a scale and preserved its democratic and republican forms. The forces of nature and of men were destined, however, to disprove that prophecy. The pattern of American life was predominantly English; differences in civilization between the states and sections were considerable but not insurmountable; and the whole body politic was thoroughly familiar, through five centuries of experience, with the democratic principle of representation. In the years that passed, each section made its contribution to the American experiment in democracy. Each section furnished leadership, new principles of government, new interpretations of old doctrines. Conservatism and radicalism lived side by side, and each augmented the strength and vigor of the democratic principle.

Political institutions had developed along roughly parallel lines in the different colonies; although methods of local government somewhat lacked uniformity, the governments of the colonies were strikingly similar. England made little conscious effort at guidance, though her own internal history affected the colonial scene. Foundations of greater political liberalism had been laid during the seventeenth century, when English governmental institutions were groping for stability; little was accomplished during the first half of the eighteenth century, for the forces of conservatism held the reins of government. England's great mistake, from the English point of view, was of great service to American democracy. She did not create a colonial nobility. Had she sprinkled this country with a colonial peerage, it might have been civil war and not revolution when the break came; and the leadership of the tidewater South, of so much consequence during the Revolutionary period, might have remained loyal to the Mother Country.[1] There was certainly only one true democratic community in Colonial America—Pennsylvania. Here there was no hierarchy as in New England; no great aristocracy as in New York; no plantation oligarchy as in Virginia and South Carolina. Democracy, at least in the present meaning of the term, was of the future.[2]

The democratic formulative period in America—from the time of the Revolution to the Mexican War—saw three southerners develop into the constructive statesmen who directed, in large measure, the future course of American Democracy. Each was more than a political leader; he was the embodiment of a

[1] This point of view was developed by Francis Lieber in his work, *On Civil Liberty and Self-Government*, published in 1853. A portion of the book is published in Harry R. Warfel, Ralph H. Gabriel, and Stanley T. Williams, *The American Mind* (New York, 1937), pp. 441-44.

[2] Edwin Wiley and Irving E. Rines, *The United States, Its Beginnings, Progress and Modern Development* (Washington, 1912), IV, 498-99.

movement. Jefferson appeared first; and, though Washington was the military genius of the Revolution, Jefferson was its spokesman. There is hardly an important phase of American political or social development to which he did not make a valuable contribution. To his native state and to the nation he left a legacy in his contributions to the national government, in the liberal re-enactment of Virginia's antiquated code, in the law for religious freedom, and in the abolition of primogeniture. Calhoun is not usually thought of as a contributor to democracy, though his insistence on states' rights certainly had democratic implications. His interpretation of the constitution envisaged a nation in which state and minority rights would be secure; for, in his opinion, only a union conscious of minority rights could endure. Jackson, though not a political theorist, became the leader of surging forces that engulfed the nation; their guiding principle was the right of the people to control the measures of the government.

Political democracy, not economic democracy, was the keynote of the ante-bellum South. Or it might be said that "community independence" was its cardinal principle. There was democracy in the Old South, democracy interpreted according to the political conceptions of that day and of that section. Socially, and to a lesser extent politically, the *nouveau-riche* cotton, sugar, or tobacco snob and the numerically small long-settled landed gentry dominated the scene, the former with awkward braggadocio, the latter with calm and easy grace. The small farmers admired and respected the planter aristocracy and loyally supported it whenever Southern institutions were under attack. Even the poor white, he of many local nomenclatures—the "Wool Hat Boys," the "Red Necks," the "Rosin Heels"—chattered to himself of kinship with the great land-

owning class as he stirred his few miserable acres for a few miserable pounds of cotton or tobacco. The reason for this solidarity was the democratic character of the feudal system. It was not a static society. The wealthy stratum was by no means closed or exclusively hereditary. New estates were created by farmers who had been both thrifty and competent, or by outsiders from the North or from the border states. Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas offered opportunity for all; and a certain democratic feeling arose from the realization of that fact. Race and in some instances caste, not class, were the sources of the only recognizable fissure in society.[3] There was remarkably little resentment against concentration of wealth, land, or slaves.[4] Democracy was taken for granted, interwoven into the social fabric of the state in a way now difficult to explain; and the most vital issue became the price of cotton, of tobacco, or of sugar. Idealism was accompanied by knowledge and hence a dignified political deportment; for leaders who knew their Jeremy Taylor, their Montesquieu, and their Voltaire "were not inclined to make social spectacles of themselves."[5]

During the whole era, in the opinion of many northerners, the South was moving in countermarch to the rest of the nation. The world of that day was radical in temper and nationalistic in policy; the South was conservative and stressed local rights under the central government. She was measured by current

[3] Roger W. Shugg, in his *Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana* (University, Louisiana, 1939), p. 29, applies this statement to Louisiana. It would apply to the entire South.

[4] For an exposition of this statement see *ibid.*, p. 28, and F. L. Olmsted, *A Journey in the Back Country* (London, 1860), p. 21.

[5] Archibald Rutledge, *Home by the River* (Indianapolis, 1941), p. 36.

standards and was found wanting. It has been said that prior to 1830 she was inhabited by a provincial people; after 1830 by a sectional people. But the fundamental differences between North and South were, and still are, much exaggerated. The areas where the plantation tradition actually existed were small when compared to the whole of the Southland; these were the Tidewater and a portion of the Piedmont in Virginia and Maryland, the narrow South Carolina-Georgia coast, the Bluegrass of Kentucky and the Great Basin of Tennessee, the cotton-sugar region of Mississippi and Louisiana extending from Natchez to the gulf. Here was the romantic South of Thomas Nelson Page and of John Esten Cooke. But "the South was at once a sophisticated civilization and a frontier,"[6] with all the graduated stages in between. There were a fighting frontier, an agricultural frontier, a cattle frontier, and to a lesser extent, mining and timbering frontiers—all with the frontier's usual leveling processes, and all warring politically against the older settled plantation and urban areas. The newer South drew heavily upon the old. Kentucky and Tennessee drew their intellectual and political sustenance from the "Old Dominion"; the states of the deep Black Belt drew their lifeblood from South Carolina. The inconsistency between the institution of slavery and the principles of democracy had long been apparent; and social disapproval had been manifest during the first years of independence; but Jefferson's philosophy of equalitarian idealism gave way to that of Calhoun, which offered the substitution of practical economic realism.[7] Secession came, and to the Southerner it was the simple "assertion of the inalienable right

[6] J. G. Randall, *The Civil War and Reconstruction* (New York, 1937), p. 3.

[7] Vernon Louis Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought* (New York, 1930), II, 3-4.

of a people to change their government, whenever it ceased to fulfill the purposes for which it was ordained and established."[8]

The War for Southern Independence "legislated" slavery out of existence and guaranteed to American posterity one country and one flag. The Southerner who had been taught to accept fame without vanity now accepted defeat without apology. Bill Arp's rejoinder was typical: "Well, I killed as many of them as they did of me, and now I'm going to work." Or the summation of the Confederate private: "You may leave the South if you want to, but I am going to Sandersville, kiss my wife and raise a crop, and if the Yankees fool with me any more, I'll whip 'em again."[9]

But death did not grant the Old South the holiday it so richly deserved. It lived on in the new South, some of its basic problems still present. The Old South had rested everything on slavery and an agricultural system and was unaware of her economic anemia. Slavery was gone, but the negro was still present; the old agricultural system was gone, but the land was eternal. Still convalescing from the war and further weakened by division in her councils, the rantings of parochial creeds, and a lack of intellectual leadership, the agrarian South, now largely plebeian, joined the Middle Border in its uprising against the social and political irregularities of the time. The middle class, represented by Henry W. Grady, proposed a surrender to the Yankee principle of industrial exploitation, while the remnant of the old aristocracy resisted the new and clung to the traditions of the past. Thomas Nelson Page, Joel Chandler Harris, and George Washington Cable attended to the

[8] Jefferson Davis, *The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government* (New York, 1881), I, 184.

[9] The above anecdotes were told by Henry W. Grady in his famous address, "The New South."

romantic traditions of the plantation, the negro, and the Creole. It was "The Man" Bilbos, "Cotton Tom" Heflins, and other demagogues, ham actors all, whose reasoning was so tortuous it was impossible to determine where their idealism ended and their demagoguery began, who gave their section notoriety. The new southern spirit of democracy was voiced by such men as L. Q. C. Lamar, John B. Gordon, John Sharp Williams, Hilary A. Herbert, Benjamin H. Hill, and others.

The political leaders of the post-Reconstruction Era were not allied, as has often been charged, in a common hostility to popular government and democratic institutions. The majority of them represented a new generation, their early years tried by the war, energetic young business men, crusading editors, small-town bankers, merchants and industrialists, country-store planters who were resolved to wipe away the social, political, and economic heritages of a renegade reconstruction. Reared in bankruptcy and political degradation, they held to a creed of cheap government, economic reconstruction, a shifting and resettlement of population, a redistribution of the land, establishment of new occupations, and a realignment of social relations. The poor white, who brought nothing to the marts of trade but his labor, was to be as much a beneficiary as the son of the landed gentry. The Granger movement, the Farmers' Alliances, and finally the Populist revolt were expressions of the South's search for salvation. After 1900, fundamentalism, the newly discovered industrial system, land tenancy, the Ku Klux Klan, and other problems plagued her leaders. One old problem remained—the negro. To the pool-room-witted exhibitionist demagogue, he was not a problem, but an opportunity. But few who have accused the negro of weakness understand his patience with the incomprehensible idiosyncrasies of his white

brethren; and an even smaller number realize that he has made his brand of democracy workable by his philosophy of living exclusively in the present, a contrast to many of us who dwell in the past or live for the future.

The South that was, in which one could take a census of all the Republicans by counting the postmasters and the one-horse farmers, the land of the one-crop system, the land of "glorious agrarianism," the land of illiteracy and special privilege, the land of "Judge Lynch" with a Bible Belt all its own—that land is disappearing. Such old descriptive phrases are epitaphs of a passing period. A new horizon, a new spirit, a new economic order, a new democracy have come to the South, and in a world in which democracy is everywhere threatened, the South will not fail to contribute its share of toil and sacrifice toward the achievement of the American ideal.

The University Trains for Citizenship

E. B. ROBERT

LOUISIANA State University is attempting to meet its obligation to the state and nation in a time of international crisis. We will not be the last to surrender to the attack upon freedom and democracy; we will never surrender to it. In meeting its responsibility to train for citizenship in a democracy, this University is not called upon to depart, nor should it depart, from the maintenance of its traditional ideals. Our duty beckons us rather to an intensified service on behalf of them to preserve the atmosphere in which those ideals may flourish and not be slighted; to inspire every teacher and student, every department of instruction, whether in the academic or practical arts, with their influence; to inject their spirit into all our personal relationships upon the campus and in the field. Such a creed is essential to the fulfillment of the university ideal, whether applied to pure scholarship or to preparation for citizenship, whether in time of emergency or in the days of peace to which we look forward. Through loyalty to this creed we serve in the defense of democracy.

We recognize that the enjoyment of free educational oppor-

tunities, particularly in a state, tax-supported institution, carries with it obligations to our representative democracy, resting both upon students and upon the employed staff. The teacher, above all others, should stand as an example of the responsible use of civil liberties, especially in times like these in which we are now living.

Ours is the American's Creed through which each of us says:

"I believe in the United States of America as a government of the people, by the people, for the people; whose just powers are derived from the consent of the governed; a democracy in a republic; a sovereign nation of many sovereign states; a perfect union, one and inseparable; established upon those principles of freedom, equality, justice and humanity for which American patriots sacrificed their lives and fortunes.

"I therefore believe it is my duty to my country to love it; to support its constitution; to obey its laws; to respect its flag; and to defend it against all enemies."

We make no more apology for indoctrination against subversive ideologies than we make for vaccination or inoculation against smallpox or typhoid fever. We believe that democratic society must educate its children in the democratic way of thinking and living to insure its survival and progress.

Louisiana State University is not dedicated to one segment of society; nor is its service limited by a narrow conception of classical, professional, scientific, or vocational education. Just as training for citizenship involves the development of many aspects of the individual, so does the program of Louisiana State University involve many and varied fields of learning and experience. In a brief discussion of this kind one could not name all of the colleges, divisions, schools, departments, curricula, and services of the University. Certainly one could not dwell upon the contribution of each to the making of the good

citizen. Therefore I have simply indicated in broad outline the creed of the University. I shall now indicate how this creed operates to produce the individual who is an informed, skilled, and socialized citizen of a democracy. Our conviction is that all citizens must be informed, skilled, and socialized if we are to avoid a caste system and are to maintain mutual respect and understanding and national unity.

Every student who comes to this University has an opportunity to pursue academic courses, to acquire skill in a trade or profession, and to participate freely in the social life of the University. Some who do not understand the purposes or program of a state university have a tendency to sneer at or to characterize such an ideal as a leveling influence. There is no leveling; on the contrary, there is a democratizing influence which does not deny each individual the opportunity to develop his academic or professional talents to the fullest and to win leadership or to learn to follow as he does in a democratic society in life beyond the college.

The academic program of Louisiana State University includes a knowledge of our human heritage—history, philosophy, religion, sociology, economics, languages, the arts, sciences, and mathematics. Naturally, every student does not pursue every subject, but everyone has an opportunity to make a serious study of man's progress, his achievements, his aspirations, and his contribution to human welfare. Such information engenders an appreciation of man's rise from the savage; of the family; of the state; of institutions of society in their present and their historical setting. Such information is a basic element in the education of every citizen in a democracy. The citizen who has this foundation has a perspective which constitutes a bulwark of safety against propaganda in a time of crisis.

The vocational and professional offerings of the University range from "refresher" courses taught at night to meet the present emergency for skilled labor in defense industries to the curricula for the Ph.D. degree and professional degrees in law, medicine, public welfare, and library science. It is absolutely essential in a democracy that every individual be economically efficient and self-sustaining if he is to earn a livelihood and to contribute to the society to which he belongs. No trade or profession is unworthy for the individual to learn or for a great university to teach so long as free enterprise among free men is sustained, and so long as technical knowledge can be better imparted by the state than it can be supplied by apprenticeship in private industry. The University is therefore developing the skilled, as well as the informed, citizen. The staff, the facilities, the research of the University are becoming increasingly available to adult citizens, to the public, the state, and the nation.

The University is particularly proud of its contribution to national defense and safety through military science which has been an integral part of its program since this institution was established. Military training, despite what a few pacifists and academicians may say, is one of the finest contributions to good citizenship. The very vastness of the future military establishment of the United States makes imperative a civilian share in military thought, unless this vastness is to become from the outset an arid desert of over-discipline and under-thinking. Only such thought and instruction can give the American people some day a group of legislators with sufficient expert judgment on military matters to cooperate with the military forces in spending of money. We might also have publicists equal to their task and even newspaper correspondents with a little of

that knowledge of military events which has been so conspicuously absent from the thousands of words cabled home from Africa, Greece, and other theaters of war—dispatches so devoid of recognition of military significance that they have contributed in no small degree to the bewilderment and unpreparedness of the American public mind. And most important of all, we might have a youth that fights, when it comes to fight, with understanding and conviction.

The University not only provides basic academic courses and courses for the development of vocational and professional skills, but it also maintains and encourages a wide variety of organizations and activities which afford students opportunities for developing social and personal traits highly desirable in the good citizen. Some of these organizations grow out of and are directly related to academic and professional work but are largely carried on through student initiative and leadership. Most of the academic departments have clubs or organizations which are designed to promote the voluntary extension of the students' knowledge and appreciation of literature, science, languages, music, art, mathematics, and other subjects. Similar clubs, societies, and professional fraternities relate primarily to vocational interests. Through the selection of officers and the planning of programs many students learn to contribute to the welfare of particular groups and to university life as a whole. In meetings of such clubs and societies, students learn the ways of democracy. They learn the value of organization, of discussion, and of knowledge applied to problems of group welfare. In these smaller groups talent for leadership is discovered; this talent is later applied in larger groups serving the entire student body.

Aside from academic and professional clubs there are numerous organizations which develop in students personal and social traits which are invaluable in the life of the University and of society as a whole. To mention only a few of the larger university organizations, there are the Y.M.C.A., the Y.W.C.A., religious groups of the various churches; the student council with its own constitution; the Honor Court; the college and class organizations; social fraternities and sororities; athletic and other recreational groups; dormitory groups; student publications such as the *Reveille* and the *Gumbo;* and honor societies.

Through such organizations students have a vital part in determining the conditions under which they live in the University community. Students learn to select their leaders and to reward those traits which they value most. The programs sponsored by student organizations are excellent training for participation in group life after college. It is not infrequently that leadership of students in various fields leads to immediate employment in similar fields upon graduation.

The tolerance that is exemplified among religious groups on the campus, the cooperation among rival groups, the sense of duty and responsibility that develops, the wholesome recreation that is sponsored, the honest and frank discussion of controversal issues lead one to believe that the student organizations on the University campus are as potent a force in the defense of democracy as are the academic and professional opportunities afforded by organized curricula.

The Louisiana State University is developing citizenship within the framework of a philosophy of education that is in harmony with democratic ideals. It is giving youth fundamental infor-

mation upon which to base intelligent thinking about human welfare. It is giving vocational and professional training that will make youth economically efficient citizens. It is promoting student organizations which develop the personal, moral, and social virtues upon which democracy arose and upon which it rests.

IV

THE INDIVIDUAL: MAN'S SELF-EXPRESSION

Freedom of Speech in a Democracy

HARLEY A. SMITH

YOU have a perfect right to say what you want to say. You have the privilege of expressing your opinions. Freedom of oral expression is one of the guarantees of a liberal democracy. "Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech." Article 1 of the Bill of Rights guarantees you the right to talk, *but* it does not protect you if you are sued for slander or libel.

Not so very long ago a friend of mine was visiting in New York City. He decided that he would like the experience of attempting to attract and hold listeners at Columbus Circle. He asked a policeman what he had to do in order to speak at Columbus Circle. The policeman replied: "All you need is a box, a permit from the City Hall, and an American flag. You can talk about anything you want to and it is absolutely free. Only be careful what you say." Yes, the right to talk about "anything you want to" was granted—only one had to be "careful what" he said.

It was my friend's right to talk. But that right would not protect him if what he said incited a group to riot; or if what he said brought suits for slander or libel. Just how much is

such a right worth? Just how *free* is speech in a democracy? Is it free just so long as—as what? What are the boundaries of freedom? When does freedom become license?

Does not the problem of free speech center in one question: is freedom of speech granted us for the pleasure of the individual or for the good of the state?

Recently the officials of a province in Canada had all of the books written by Charles A. Lindbergh taken from their libraries. The reason? The officials did not disapprove of the books, but they did disapprove of remarks Lindbergh made long after the books were printed. Canada calls itself a democratic country. You may say: "Canada is at war. She has a perfect right to take away another's right of free speech—or to make him suffer for indulging in that right." Or you may say: "No matter what the condition, democracy should allow oral expression of all thoughts." Was the good of the state, Canada, in jeopardy? Was Lindbergh denied his pleasure in speaking? (Of course it is not necessary to go to Canada to find examples. One does not have to go out of his own state, his own parish, or his own town.)

Let us say that I do not want to salute the flag of the United States. I express my oral disapproval of this activity by quoting from the Bible. I quote from the fifth chapter of Deuteronomy, verses 7, 8, and 9:

> Thou shalt have none other gods before me.
>
> Thou shalt not make thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the waters beneath the earth:
>
> Thou shalt not bow down thyself unto them, nor serve them:

I may say that the flag is a "graven image" or a "likeness" of something on earth. In Webster's I find that *salute* may be

defined as: "to compliment by an act of ceremony, as by a bow." Therefore, to salute the flag would be to bow to a graven image. I may firmly believe in my right to express my disapproval of compulsory salute to the flag. I may even go so far as to refuse to salute the flag because I interpret that action as a bow to a graven image. I can interpret the Bible broadly, and I can interpret my privileges as guaranteed by the Constitution very broadly. I have the right to express my oral disapproval. The Bill of Rights grants it to me. But the Bill of Rights does not guarantee to protect me becaue I have given my opinion. Is my broad interpretation of my rights of freedom of speech legitimate?

Let us assume that I want to get something very badly. In order to achieve my wish I find it necessary to outwit, outtalk, out-influence another person. I am a fairly honest person, but I find it helpful to question a few things in my opponent's past. I may not know of any actual wrong-doing by him, but certain actions in his past appear questionable. (And where is the person whose entire life appears unquestionable to all people?) I may not actually accuse my opponent of certain acts—but I insinuate. I drop enough untruths to leave a doubt in the minds of my listeners. It is my right of free speech. But, if I have no proof to back my insinuations, have I overstepped the boundaries of free speech? Am I interpreting my rights too broadly? Am I primarily concerned with my own pleasure, or am I concerned with the good of the group?

The individual is in no way completely separate from the state. He is the state. The health of the state depends upon the health of its members. The health of the members depends upon the pleasure of the majority of those individuals. When the individual members become so mentally deadened or vocally

curbed that they cease to have and express individual ideas, the pleasure of the citizen is not being considered, and certainly the health of the state is poor.

It is possible to satisfy the citizen and maintain the good health of the state. How? If I were able to give you a formula for reaching that condition, I would indeed be a wise person. But is such a formula necessary or even possible? I do not believe that any formula will safeguard this important freedom.

If what is happening to me does not meet with my approval, do I have the right to express disapproval? Yes, I should and must have the right to register that disapproval. But I must give valid, logical reasons why my opinion should be given consideration. I must explain why I am an exceptional case, why my disapproval should be heard. Even if I am a lone voice in the group, I still have the right to be heard. So far, the pleasure of the individual is important. If I can show that my opinions, while not agreeing with those of the group, will not harm a majority, I should not only be allowed to express my opinions but should also be allowed to follow my belief. On the other hand, if the free speech which affords me pleasure harms the majority, I should temper my remarks and actions. Not that I need to agree with the majority, but I must concede the rights of others to have opinions different from mine. I need to be on the fringe of agreement with the majority *if* the good of the majority is at stake.

We must remember that it is not always possible for each individual to express his opinion. In any group there must be a spokesman for the majority and for the minority or minorities. Radio has rather effectively solved this problem. In the National Association of Broadcasters Code Manual we find this: "The code had evoked some misconceptions about free

speech. In the United States we have some 130,000,000 people, each with the right of free speech, of freedom of worship, and assembly, each able to enjoy the benefits of a free press. Is it possible for 130,000,000 individuals to exercise their right of free speech on but 800 radio stations? Of course not. Neither is it possible for 130,000,000 Americans to collect on Capitol Hill in Washington at the same time to debate the common destiny. We go about this through a system of representation; we do the same in radio. People exercise their right of free speech and choice in advocating or opposing a cause or person. Thus segments of public opinion are formed, pro and con. Radio can accommodate only the spokesman, not every follower. Our requirement is that if one side of a controversial issue is presented, the listener has the right to hear the opposing viewpoint under similar conditions." Radio has attempted to solve the problem of oral expression of ideas by considering both the pleasure of the individual and the good of the state. How can other groups meet the difficulties inherent in the theory of free self-expression?

The solution lies in the ability of each individual to distinguish in his own speech (and in the speech of others) his reasons for talking. To have unlimited freedom, without possible retaliation by another person, or a group, is not possible. The freedom we now have is often abused. Too prolonged and too severe an abuse of anything will eventually destroy it. So with our exceedingly valuable right, freedom of speech. Interestingly enough we have individuals, and groups, using that very freedom to do away with the freedom. Should they be stopped? Who should stop them? If the health of the entire group is at stake, they should be stopped. And they should be stopped not by law but by the larger voice of the entire group.

If, in my desire to reach a personal end, I abuse my privilege of free speech, that privilege should be taken from me. My fellow members in the group should take it from me, not by the force of law, but by the force of intelligent, weighed arguments.

I should be given the right to disagree; I should be given an equal voice with my co-workers; I should be allowed a fair public hearing. And when once I have been given that impartial hearing and the majority has decided against me, it should not mean that henceforth I must acquiesce in the will of that group. But it should mean that I must make certain adjustments to meet, temporarily, the will of the majority. And if I have arrived at my opinion sincerely and intelligently, I should not relax vigilance because I have been temporarily out-voiced. I can still be an effective member of the group while maintaining my individual rights.

The pleasure of each sincere, thoughtful citizen is a necessity. The pleasure of each sincere, thoughtful citizen must be recognized. But when the health of the larger group—the state—is at stake, all individuals in that group cannot be satisfied. When I resort to undemocratic, subversive activities for my own pleasure, I am abusing my pleasure, my privilege.

Freedom is not license so long as it is a sincere, thoughtful, backed-with-proof presentation of an individual's idea. It is license when those oral expressions are working to destroy the very basic elements in the democracy, whether it be an unwarranted attack upon an individual in that democracy or upon the principles of that democracy.

Never was our freedom of speech so much in jeopardy as it is now. If we want to preserve that freedom, all of us must be on the alert. We must use that freedom sincerely and ear-

nestly. We must avoid abusing it. It behooves all of us to be on the alert to detect its abuse by others. No right is absolute. The right of freedom of speech is not absolute in that it is anterior to all other rights. Limitations are necessary. If those limitations are too tightly drawn, then the death of this right is inevitable. But the right can be reduced to an absurdity by selfish, fantastic privileges. To try with determination to keep the right from becoming an absurdity, to keep freedom of speech for a means of individual satisfaction leading to the good of the entire group, is the responsibility of each one of us. To have so much freedom of speech that we will take freedom of speech away from ourselves is not an impossibility. The amount of freedom of speech we will have depends upon the ability of each person to defend and not abuse that right.

Freedom of the Press in Democratic and Totalitarian States

BRUCE R. McCOY

IN THIS brief discussion we must travel rapidly. We must take a hurried excursion to Japan, then stop a few moments in Russia, go on to Italy, up to Germany, and hurry back to America. We must do even more than that: we must take a quick but penetrating look backward into early American history—all this in order to capture, if we can, the basic significance, the practical, workaday meaning to all of us of the freedom of the press.

The Japanese empire is a totalitarian state. The rule of the governing class is practically absolute. The essence of the government over 100 million Japanese is thought-control, backed by police power. Japan's governing class believes in national ignorance and in rule by prohibition. Japan has newspapers but not a free press. Government censorship is effective and complete. In the sixteen months from January, 1935, to May, 1936, for example, fifty-eight different bans were imposed on the press. In addition to working under these definite bans against publishing matter on certain topics, editors are subject

to sentence to jail or to death for violation of the Seditious Literature Bill. A Japanese editor daring to discuss the wisdom of Japan's policy in China, for example, could be jailed on the charge of "subverting the public mind" if the governing class wished, for it controls the decisions as to what constitutes such subversion. The press of Japan is not a newspaper; it is a tool of the governing class to aid it in the manipulation of the national mind.

As we use the term in this country, Russia also is a totalitarian state, with some 166 million people under its dictatorship. Russia led off with suppression of the press when Lenin and Trotsky took over in 1918. The government owns the presses and has a monopoly on newsprint. It controls the one important news agency, Tass. It censors news at the source by selection, and on delivery, by suppression or alteration. There is no freedom of the press in Russia. Since the press is either governmental or Communist party, it has no desire for freedom. Every editor, indirectly, is a government official or a member of the Communist party. Russian papers are dependent neither upon circulation nor upon advertising for their revenue. Soviet editors do not concern themselves with what their readers think but rather with what the Soviet leaders *want them to think.*

Italy, with its 40-odd millions of people, is a totalitarian state. During the past fifteen years the Italian press has become 100 per cent Fascist. As far back as 1934 one authoritative observer wrote as follows: "In Italy, a new generation is growing into youth and manhood almost entirely ignorant of what is happening beyond their frontiers. From one end of the country to the other—Venice to Naples and Genoa to Brindisi—the newspapers carry identical pronunciamentos when Rome so orders. . . . So far as internal and external news is concerned,

their columns might as well be stereotyped. . . . The Italian press, except as a house organ of the regime in power, is a farce." Fascist control is exercised through its Ministry of Popular Culture, and frequent "instructions" to the newspaper come from this ministry's Division of the Italian Press. An indication of the character and completeness of press control is revealed in a compilation by one editor of about thirty different instructions received in a five-month period in 1935. Here are a few examples:

Give no news of the bombardments of inhabited centers by the Spanish Nationalists, and above all deny that it is done by Italian or German aviators.

Do not give any news of the dissolution of the Austrian Fascist Party.

Begin and continue a strong campaign against Czecho-Slovakia.

Suppress entirely news of the arrival at Naples of wounded volunteers coming from Spain.

Dilate upon the Yagoda incident in Soviet Russia, and play up the supremacy and immorality of the adventurer, Stalin.

Emphasize the news about the big crowd at Rome for tomorrow's review.

The year of 1933 marked the coming to power of the National Socialists in Germany. That year also witnessed the abolition of the freedom of the German press. When Hitler came into power, he lost no time in bringing the press under his absolute dictatorship, using confiscation when other means failed. To us, democracy implies discussion. But the Nazis do not believe in democracy. To them leadership is all-important; and the press, radio, and all other expressions of the public will are to be utilized primarily for supporting the policy of the government in power. Discussion belongs only to the leaders, and the leaders are named by the Fuehrer. The function

of German newspapers since 1933 has been, not to discuss, but to interpret and to support the government and its decisions with all the arguments it can bring forward. Policies of the government have become the general editorial policies of the papers.

So much for press conditions in the four largest totalitarian states. Similar conditions exist in many other nations.

In 1930 Karl A. Bickel, general manager of the United Press, wrote:

"In almost three-fourths of the so-called civilized world, the news emanating from the various nations is controlled by governmental censorship."

In 1934 the situation had grown worse; for Bruce Bliven, an editor of the *New Republic,* said: "Two-thirds of the population of the world today is living under *rigid and complete* censorship. Eight-ninths of the world's population is under serious governmental restriction on free speech. Only one-ninth, or roughly some 228 million persons, live in countries where newspapers are without formal censorship, and enjoy the degree of freedom which we know in the United States."

"The degree of freedom which we enjoy in the United States"! That is no intellectual abstraction. Nor did we gain it easily. We can best understand its present practical reality if we turn back in history to 1733.

The England of two centuries ago, I think we may agree, did some things in the manner of a totalitarian state. Note carefully this excerpt from the English law then in force and see whether you recognize anything familiar: "If people should not be called to account for possessing the people with an ill opinion of the government, no government can subsist. For it is necessary for all governments that the people should have

a good opinion of it." This law was invoked in numerous cases in England to punish editors who dared criticize or discuss government policies, and the same law had been extended to the American colonies, where the colonial governors were intrusted with the power of censorship.

In 1733 a colonial editor of the New York *Weekly Journal,* who had published articles favoring liberty of the press and critical of Governor Cosby, was arrested on a charge of libel and imprisoned under bail greater than he could raise. For nine months John Peter Zenger edited his paper from his cell. Zenger, an almost penniless printer, nevertheless had the services of two able lawyers, who made every effort to get him out of jail. These efforts soon resulted in the arbitrary disbarment of the two attorneys, and the court then appointed a new defense attorney known to be friendly to the governor. Friends of Zenger quietly dispatched an emissary to Philadelphia to seek the legal service of Andrew Hamilton, one of the great colonial lawyers. In spite of his advanced age of 80 years and feeble health, Hamilton promptly agreed to go to New York to defend Zenger.

The trial took place August 4, 1734. John Peter Zenger was acquitted. Freedom of the press was born. That trial was the forerunner of the great struggle of the Revolution, a mighty milestone in the fight to establish the world's first great democracy.

Yes, freedom of expression, freedom of the press, is the chief bulwark against a government of oppression. It was true when Andrew Hamilton defended Peter Zenger; it is true today. The dictator governments themselves attest this fact by curbing press freedom as the first step in establishing the totalitarian state.

"I labour under the weight of many years," pleaded Hamilton to the Zenger jury; "yet old and weak as I am, I should think it my duty to go to the utmost part of the land in assisting to quench the flame of prosecutions upon informations, set on foot by government, to deprive a people of remonstrating, and complaining of, the arbitrary attempts of men in power. . . . It is not the cause of a poor printer, nor of New York alone, which you are trying: no! it may, in its consequences affect every freeman that lives under a British government on the main of America. It is the best cause: it is the cause of liberty! Every man who prefers freedom to a life of slavery will bless and honor you, as men who have baffled the attempt of tyranny and laid a noble foundation for securing to ourselves, our posterity, and our neighbors the liberty both of exposing and opposing arbitrary power by speaking and writing truth."

Thus did an aged colonial lawyer, more than two centuries ago, win a battle for American democracy as glorious and significant as the later victories at Lexington and Bunker Hill. Thus did Andrew Hamilton warn all of us that democracy can not have birth nor survive without a free press.

Dictatorship and freedom of the press cannot exist together. Democracy cannot exist without a free press.

If national defense means, on one hand, the preservation of the democratic way of life by preparations to resist the threat of possible military aggression, it also means the safeguarding of those basic freedoms which make democracy possible. The threat to those freedoms may come from within as well as from without our borders. Complete national defense means resisting such threats from whatsoever source they come.

An eminent supreme court justice said:

"Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to pro-

tect liberty when the government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding. The destruction or abridgment of a free press would be an event so evil in its consequences that the least approach toward that end should be halted at the threshold."

Democracy and the Arts

ROBERT BECHTOLD HEILMAN

SOME weeks ago a convict in a state prison wrote a letter to a weekly magazine in which he said, "I hope that all you outsiders are not being made sick by all you hear over the radio about democracy." His remark ought to be a clear warning to us who are discussing any phase of the subject: a warning not to be content with easy and evasive generalities and with mere tag-ends of praise and hypnotic self-congratulation, but, on the other hand, a warning to attempt less sedative themes, such as the conditions necessary to democracy, the responsibilities imposed upon democrats, certain internal dangers they face. It would be easy to say, "We in a democracy are to be envied for the fine work in the arts that we are doing." But we had better, I think, go beyond pride, or at least try to; to explore a bit further the relationship, if there is one, between democracy and the arts, to see what else we need besides an orgy of tub-thumping.

What we have to say here is a phase of the subject "Freedom of Speech in a Democracy" when those terms are used in their most inclusive sense, since the arts are among our ways of speech,

of self-expresion; they are perhaps our most searching, most thorough, most disciplined ways of self-expression; with their unique concrete appeal to the imagination they are our most permanent speech. They are a record of free investigation which we leave to successors who will largely forget our political oratory, our economic debates, our editorial pride and our editorial alarm. For, when we write novels and plays and poems, we do not write merely about people and events and objects of a specific time and place, though all these must be specific; we are also commenting on all mankind as we understand it. Our painting and sculpture are not mere photographic records, to help us remember how some one or some thing looked at some time; they are ways of explaining the permanent meaning which artists find in the world they see. Nor is music, as you know, to be dismissed as a pleasant jingle of sounds that one dances to and forgets, a five-cent intermission in the serious business of life.

Freedom of the arts is really freedom to investigate and to report on all aspects of human life and experience, using all the resources of the different media—words, colors, forms, sounds. They constitute man's most far-reaching self-evaluation, his most complete and uncompromising facing of the world he lives in, whether he finds the admirable and the beautiful or the ugly and the intolerable. In man's capacity to make and to bear such an investigation of himself is the evidence that he is mature and responsible.

Now it is precisely the mature and responsible human being that is the foundation of a sound democratic state; it is when we are immature and irresponsible that we practically demand a ruler with a rod. And on the other hand: a ruler with a rod must demand that his people be immature and irresponsible. If

they are grown up, if they can and want to make decisions about good and evil, right and wrong, justice and injustice, and to act accordingly, they are no longer suitable materials for a dictator to impose his will on, even though he may be the most benevolent of despots.

Here is the essential reason why we know that the arts cannot be free in a dictatorship: they are the best evidence of the mature man's independence of judgment, of his freedom to evaluate the world in which he lives. Art is of its own nature the antithesis of dogmatic authority. And when you have art, with its powerful multifold appeal to the imagination—a vast human force that is not subject to legal restraints or to extra-legal control—you have a dynamic impulse that will move people in spite of all arbitrary authority.

This does not mean, however, that art is a kind of counter-propaganda the primary function of which is to expose oppression and fraud in high places, or to stir up revolts. By no means. When the artist becomes propagandist—and this is, after all, rather trite—he gives up the very freedom which is essential to his being an artist. Even though he may represent an excellent cause, he is still only a press agent. So the artist *as artist* cannot be pictured as a professional rebel. He may *in effect* contribute to a revolution, but he may be said to produce such a result only because he does not try to produce it. Direct social or political action is not his way of working. He is the painter, the recorder, the interpreter, the evaluater of all mankind, of a complete mankind fully observed in all its attributes. As such he can never dwindle into the propagandist. His province is the whole truth. Now the artistic portrayal of the whole truth may very well have, as a by-product, the effect of propaganda. For when the whole truth is seen against the partial

truth, or when the whole man is seen against the partial man, those which are incomplete are going to suffer. If human beings still have any power of perception, any sense of their own values, the partial truth and the partial man cannot, when the whole truth is made clear, be taken seriously for very long.

Hence the danger of art to dictatorships. Dictatorships are, if our postulates about human beings are correct, founded on half-truths. Whether we like it or not, the half-truth must be there, else no dictatorship would survive for a week. That half-truth, however, and the half-man which it nourishes, cannot, in the long run, risk competition with the entireties from which they have been subtracted—more especially when the whole truth comes in the imaginative forms which belong uniquely to the artist. It is as the effective, the irrefutable speaker of whole truths in a world devoted to halves that the artist may incidentally resemble the propagandist or incidentally seem, as he so often does, the rebel.

Let me restate the point slightly. A dictatorship draws its strength from its appeal to *certain* human instincts and weaknesses. Hence the dictator must see to it that man lives imaginatively for and by those instincts, that imaginatively the rewards of so living are a complete satisfaction, so that other demands which his nature makes are forgotten or minimized. To make men live thus is the function of propaganda. And the dictator must compel art, the master of the imagination, to go along with propaganda in corroborating the way of life which he has imposed. But art, as we have seen, cannot go along. It can, of course, and it does, recognize the human instincts and desires which make dictatorships possible; these are inevitably a part of the total human experience which is the province of art. But when it acknowledges only those parts of man that

make possible a totalitarian order, it is no longer art; and no official sanction can make it live longer than a tabloid editorial.

What art inevitably does, on the other hand, in dealing with complete man, is to bring into focus those aspects of his nature which he must forget if he is to live under a dictator. Art makes man consider imaginatively his whole nature, all his desires and potentialities, all the modes of thought and feeling and action possible to him. A man with so vast an outlook, subject to so powerful stimuli, is not a fit subject for dogmatic sectarian control; he cannot be. To put the matter in the most obvious way: he is made too sharply aware of those aspects of himself which must be denied by the dictator.

That is why a dictator must debase his artists into propagandists or get rid of them. It is not that they are by nature counter-propagandists or conscious rebels who are setting deliberately to work to write or paint him out of a job. Not at all. No self-respecting artist can agitate specific political problems, however admirable may be the position which he might take. I must repeat that art does not work that way; if it ever "works" politically, it is by implication, by suggestion. A political effect is always, we must remember, a by-product.

Finally, a word or two on the difficulties which believers in democracy face. We tend to talk much, I repeat, about privileges; we pat ourselves furiously on the back, as if democracy were merely a kind of Christmas present to be picked off the tree and rejoiced in. Actually, practicing democracy is very hard work, so hard that many ostensible believers in it don't practice it at all; it demands vast quantities of the hardest kind of human activity, self-control. Art, we have been saying, is the whole truth and nothing but the truth—that complete knowledge of which we speak so much but which, when we

have it, unhappily makes us often most uncomfortable. Our tolerance for art is in one way a measure of our real concern for a democratic way of life: on the one hand we must face truths which may be almost unbearably unpleasant, and on the other we must tolerate opinions and beliefs and attitudes which may seem objectionable or wrong or ridiculous. It is here that are demanded of us the maturity and responsibility on which both art and democracy depend. If we surrender to the desire, which all of us must feel at times, to choke off the expression of opinion when we do not like it, to suppress criticism which exposes sore places that we may prefer to ignore, to put down bothersome opposition that may interfere with our ease or our material interests, to burn the book or the picture that tells us wherein we are selfish or hypocritical or distorted, and to make artists tell us what we want to know and what we find it pleasant to believe—if we yield to that instinct to impose censorship, we take the first step toward overturning the way of life in which we believe. In a phrase much used officially and editorially—but usually in another sense—we become an enemy within the gates. It is hard not to take that step; it is hard, even when we talk tolerance, to practice real forbearance. That is where all of our maturity is required. We need remember John Milton's profound remark: "I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue"; in other words, freedom means not only privileges, but also a responsibility to face and deal with whole truths. It is art's function, working through the imagination, to elucidate whole truths. If art is untruthful, if it forsakes its own nature to descend into the realm of partial truths or half-truths, we have always a most effective way to deal with it: in fact, we have only one effective way to deal with it, and that one effective way is the only one compatible with our democratic beliefs: we have freedom to ignore it and to forget it.

V

RELIGION

America Means Freedom of Worship

CHARLES EDWARD SMITH

YOUR attention has already been called to some of the many right and privileges guaranteed to Americans by the federal and state constitutions. All of these rights are essential to our democratic form of government. It is the solemn obligation of all of us to cherish and defend them from attacks by individuals and groups at home or abroad.

One of the most important of our democratic rights is freedom of religion. Under the American form of government no state church can be established, nor can the power of federal or state authorities be used to compel anyone to join or attend a church. No person can be taxed or otherwise compelled to contribute to the support of religious institutions. There is no interference with the right of each individual to worship in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience. No one is restrained from expressing or teaching his religious beliefs unless, under the guise of religion, he teaches doctrines which are dangerous to public order and morality or which threaten the sovereignty and safety of the state.

The long-established principle of the separation of church

and state, however, must not obscure the implied connection between our form of government and the ideals of Christianity and Judaism. Such connection is clearly implied by the statement that men are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights. Public officials take oaths sanctioned by religion to perform and execute faithfully the duties of their respective offices; and the procedure of our courts, both civil and criminal, is in large measure based on the sanctity of the oath. Democracy is one of the expressions of the Christian and Jewish ideal of the dignity of the individual man. It is on this very point that our democratic principles come into irreconcilable conflict with the doctrines of the totalitarian states. In the countries ruled by dictators, the individual has no purpose or importance aside from the all-embracing duty to render unquestioning and unqualified obedience to the state. Neither conviction nor scruple is permitted to stand in the way of the complete subordination of the individual to the state. Pitiless persecution has been the fate of religious leaders, Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish, who have dared to denounce the actions and policies of the dictators which so completely violate religious ideals.

The founding of our country was closely connected with the quest for religious freedom. Many of the early colonists, aside from other motives that influenced their decisions, came to America to seek refuge from the religious intolerance and persecution of the Old World. The Pilgrims and Puritans in Massachusetts, the Quakers in Pennsylvania, the Catholics in Maryland—all sought to find in the New World the liberty of conscience denied them in Europe.

It is quite true, however, that the governments of the colonies were in most instances unwilling to grant to dissenting religious groups the tolerance they had secured for the faiths with which

they were identified. Roger Williams was forced to flee from Massachusetts to Rhode Island, where he founded a haven for dissenters, and John Wheelwright led a similar group into New Hampshire. In Pennsylvania, Catholics, Baptists, Methodists, and Jews were discriminated against; and in Virginia, Baptists were persecuted on the eve of the American Revolution because of their refusal to conform to the usages of the Anglican Church. It can be said that during the Colonial Period only Rhode Island consistently and freely extended liberty of worship and avoided the passage of legislation identifying the colony with a particular denomination.

During the period of the Revolution the former colonies, in the process of drawing up their state constitutions, dealt with the question of religious toleration. In every case significant progress was made toward the ideal of complete toleration. Nevertheless, established churches in several states continued to enjoy special privileges for some years after the revolutionary era, and Catholics were discriminated against in the grant of civic rights.

The Virginia constitution, which was adopted in 1776, contained a clause stating that "all men are equally entitled to the full and free exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience." This clause was framed at the insistence of James Madison, who held that Patrick Henry's original proposal for a clause granting toleration was not strong enough, since it seemed to imply that denominations other than the Anglican existed on mere sufferance.

Georgia in 1777 adopted a constitution extending freedom of worship but stating that only Protestants could be elected to the legislature. South Carolina's constitution, adopted the following year, stated that all persons who acknowledged God

should be freely tolerated but went on to declare that "the Christian Protestant religion should be deemed, and is hereby constituted and declared to be, the established religion of the state." North Carolina, on the other hand, adopted a constitution which stipulated that "no person who denied God or the truth of the Protestant religion, or the authority of Old and New Testaments, should hold office," and this clause had the practical effect of excluding Catholics and Jews from public positions.

New Jersey put into effect a constitution which guaranteed freedom of worship to all, but which reserved office-holding to Protestants. New York in 1777 repealed all laws that established or maintained any religious denomination and guaranteed free exercise and profession of religious belief. New Hampshire's Bill of Rights of 1781 declared freedom of conscience an inalienable right; Connecticut three years later extended tolerance to Protestant dissenters from the Congregational Church but required the payment of taxes for the support of such Protestant church as in each case might be designated by the taxpayer. Massachusetts adopted a similar measure in regard to the financial support of churches. Maryland's Bill of Rights, while extending tolerance to all Christians, empowered the legislature to levy a tax for the support of religion.

Federal action in regard to the extension of religious freedom was begun by the First Continental Congress in 1774. The Congress was anxious to enlist the support of the Canadian province of Quebec in resisting the policies of the British government that soon were to lead to the American Revolution. Quebec, of course, had a preponderantly Catholic population, and the anti-Catholic legislation in the colonies naturally threatened to prevent the desired union. This situation was responsible for precipitating a thorough discussion of the whole

question of religious tolerance. Representative Dickinson of Pennsylvania made an impassioned plea for the abolition of what he called the "old religious jealousies," but the matter was dropped without effective action after the passage of the Quebec Act of 1774 by the English Parliament destroyed the possibility of an agreement between the province and the thirteen colonies.

The Constitution of the United States made only one specific mention of religion. In Article VI, Section III, the Constitution states, "No religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States." This meant, of course, that citizens, whatever their faiths, were eligible for offices in the Federal Government, but the various restrictions on office-holding in the states were unaffected. The need for a Bill of Rights in the Federal Constitution soon was realized, and ten amendments accordingly were attached to the original document to extend and guarantee such rights. The first amendment states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." With the adoption of this amendment, therefore, there could be no federally established church, nor could any federal legislation be passed limiting religious freedom. The famous reserved-powers section of the constitution says, however, "Powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively or to the people." The states accordingly were not, and, for that matter, are not directly restrained from the establishment of official churches or from the imposition of such restrictions on liberty of worship as they might apply.

As already pointed out, however, the states, prior to the framing of the Federal Constitution, had adopted constitutions which

in every case extended freedom of worship, although in some of the states there still were established churches, and discriminations against Catholics and Jews, particularly in regard to office-holding, were retained. Since these state provisions were not affected by the Constitution of the United States, the quest for liberty of conscience now turned to the individual states, and it was here that the issue was fought out.

In Virginia, efforts to abolish the privileged status of the Anglican Church continued, despite the general grant of toleration embodied in the Constitution of 1776. Measures gradually were passed stripping the established church of all its privileges except that of state financial support, and this finally was eliminated by the passage of the Act of 1788 entitled "An Act Establishing Religious Freedom." The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which organized a provisional government for the great Northwest Territory, included a clause stating, "No person, demeaning himself in a peaceable and orderly manner, shall ever be molested on account of his mode of worship or religious sentiments in the said territory." The states which were formed from the Northwest Territory went further than the Ordinance in guaranteeing religious freedom, for their constitutions contained provisions against the application of religious tests for tenure of public office and prohibited the creation of state churches.

South Carolina in 1790 abolished the provision in its state constitution that designated the Protestant form of the Christian faith as the established religion. In 1818 the liberal government of Connecticut, introduced by Governor Oliver Wolcott, proceeded to abolish the law requiring compulsory support of Protestant churches and passed a constitutional amendment stating that "the exercise and enjoyment of religious profession

and worship, without distinction, shall be forever free to all persons in this state." In Massachusetts the problem of disestablishing the Congregational Church was complicated by the rise of the Unitarian denomination, so that it was not until 1833 that the state government was dissociated from preference for and support of a particular faith. Pennsylvania's revised constitution, adopted in 1837, liberalized the government's attitude toward religious questions but required that all office-holders should believe in God and in a future state of rewards and punishments. This provision was broad enough to remove the civic disabilities hitherto imposed on Catholics and Jews.

New Hampshire's original constitution stated, "Every denomination of protestant Christians, demeaning themselves quietly and as good subjects of the state, shall be equally under the protection of the law." Repeated efforts were made to remove this discriminatory section, but it nevertheless has been retained in the constitution adopted in 1889. Strangely enough, a legislative statute, passed in 1819, extends freedom to all Christian sects. This is still considered to be in effect, despite the apparent inconsistency with the constitutional provision, and has served to counteract the latter's reactionary implication.

Time does not permit an examination of the great variety of provisions concerning religion in the constitutions of other states. It may be said, however, that in all of the states the principle and spirit of the Constitution of the United States finally have been reflected in their respective constitutions or in statutory enactments. All states now forbid their legislatures to pass a law designating any faith as the established state religion. No state government is authorized to use its powers to compel church attendance or the financial support of religious institutions. All states forbid restraint upon the free exercise of

the Christian religion and impose no limitation on the expression and teaching of religious beliefs, unless such teachings seem to be clearly and reasonably irreconcilable with public morality and the peace, safety, and sovereignty of the state.

In most instances where the issue of religious freedom allegedly has been involved in more recent years, beliefs and practices of certain sects have seemed to challenge the sovereignty of the state. We rely on the federal and state governments for the defense of our basic rights as American citizens, including the right to enjoy freedom of religious profession. Freedom of religion does not and should not mean that any individual or group is free to refuse to discharge the obligations and duties of American citizenship on the plea of religious scruple. No one logically can claim the rights and privileges without at the same time accepting the responsibilities and duties of the American system. No person or group logically has the right, expressed or implied, to enjoy religious toleration guaranteed by a government which they actively or passively refuse to support. A basic understanding of this point would do much to end the agitation of misguided persons who, while quick to invoke the protection of the American form of government, nevertheless feel free to withhold acceptance of the responsibilities of American citizenship on the plea of religious conviction.

Freedom to teach religious doctrines does not include the right to engage in practices that are at variance with generally accepted moral standards. In the famous Mormon cases the courts rightly upheld the principle that polygamy could not be practiced, even though authorized by the teachings of that group. We are prepared to admit that "public morality" is an elastic term. "Public morality" is defined, in the last analysis, by the agreement of the majority of the citizenry as to what

standards and restrictions should prevail. So long as the ballot box and the courts continue to function in the American way, there is no departure from American democratic ideals when individuals or groups, despite protestation of religious belief, are restrained from the commission of acts considered dangerous to public order or morality.

From time to time during the course of our history, groups have arisen and extended their membership with the avowed purpose of encouraging religious bigotry under the guise of what they choose to call "Americanism." In some instances the activities of such groups have been openly lawless as well as in complete conflict with the fundamental principles of the American form of government. It is a duty of American citizenship to condemn such activities, from whatever quarter they may emanate and however sincere their leadership may be. Religious freedom is a fundamental American right; it must be cherished, and if necessary, actively defended as an indispensable part of our heritage.

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